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INTRODUCTION 
 
“…Crusader interference in changing curriculums is definitely one of the most 
dangerous interferences in our affairs…” 
-Osama bin Laden, speaking about education reform1 
 
Since the September 11, 2001 attack, scholars have worked vigorously to identify the 
causes of radical Islamic terrorism.  Political repression, economic stagnation, “the clash 
of civilizations,” and foreign occupation by non-Muslim troops have been their favorite 
culprits for explaining this brand of terrorism.  However, none of these causal arguments 
are independently capable of explaining the terrorism produced and experienced by the 
Arabian Peninsula, currently the largest source of foreign fighters and the staging ground 
of brutal terrorist attacks against Western tourists and U.S. embassies.2  Saudi Arabia, a 
wealthy country with relatively constant political repression, continued to experience its 
most violent spate of domestic terrorism after the United States significantly reduced its 
military presence in the country.  The most impoverished country in the Middle East, 
Yemen, has relatively low levels of political repression and houses no permanent non-
Muslim military presence to speak of, but is currently the staging ground for continuous 
terror attacks on Western tourists and embassies, including the U.S. embassy.  What 
causal factor connects these two cases in explaining their prominence in producing 
terrorism?  Bin Laden gives us a clue in the opening quote: education. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 As translated by independent terrorism analyst Dan Darling in “Special Analysis: The 12/04 Bin Laden 
Tapes,” Winds of Change, December 30, 2004, http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/006101.html.  
2
 Clint Watts, Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan: What Foreign Fighters Reveal about the Future of Terrorism 
(PJ Sage, Inc., March 24, 2008), http://www.pjsage.com/products.htm.  
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This thesis seeks to examine the role of education in Islamic radicalization and how 
the educational factor works to complement and combine causal explanations offered by 
preexisting scholarly literature.  Specifically, this paper will study the content, structure 
and accessibility of education systems in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Kuwait and their role 
in radical Islamic terrorism.   
My research will fill two critical gaps in terrorism literature.  First, while previous 
scholarly research has examined the relationship between levels of education and 
participation in terrorism, no significant empirical study has yet been conducted on 
terrorism and the content, structure and accessibility of education systems.  The second 
gap that my research intends to fill results from the fact that while Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen have both been the subject of empirical research on terrorism, no study has yet 
attempted to offer a causal explanation for terrorism in the Arabian Peninsula as a region.  
This represents a gap in terrorism literature, considering Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s 
prominent positions as producers and targets of radical Islamic terrorism.  Saudi Arabia 
has been the largest single source of foreign fighters in Afghanistan and Iraq and only 
recently succeeded in suppressing a domestic terrorist group called al-Qaeda of the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  Yemen has also been one of the top three producers of 
foreign fighters, has long served as a recruiting ground and safe haven for al-Qaeda, and 
is currently experiencing unrelenting anti-Western domestic terrorism.   
This research is also important because of its particular relevance for policymakers 
today.  Its policy relevance becomes apparent when considering the United States’ 
involvement and leadership in the “Global War on Terror” and the Arabian Peninsula’s 
position as a prominent source of terrorism against the United States in the Middle East.  
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By examining the reasons that terrorism has taken root in the Arabian Peninsula, this 
thesis provides direct policy implications for the United States.  Research on the causes 
of terrorism in the Arabian Peninsula is vital to the U.S.-led War on Terror; not only will 
it be useful in tailoring U.S. counterterrorism measures in the Arabian Peninsula itself, it 
will also provide a deeper understanding of the causes of terrorism that could be 
applicable to other regions as well.  In fact, madrassas, or Islamic religious schools, have 
been repeatedly charged as important sources of terrorists in countries in south and 
central Asia, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh.  For example, analysts have accused 
Pakistan’s abundant madrassas for contributing to the bout of terrorism the country has 
experienced and produced in recent years, including the recent attacks that devastated 
Mumbai this past November.3  
My causal model combines the educational factor with a number of independent 
variables identified by preexisting literature to offer a new explanation for radical Islamic 
terrorism.  In the model, I proposes that the nature of state education systems (whether 
their content, accessibility or structure) causes certain students to receive a radical 
religious education that denies them any marketable skills and indoctrinates them into 
high levels of sensitivity towards foreign presence, which is seen as threatening to their 
cultivated religious identity. When these individuals are unable to secure employment 
and also perceive a threatening foreign presence, they are likely to engage in religious 
terrorism in an attempt to expel the foreign presence by force.   
An example of this causal model can be found in Yemen, where students in many 
areas either lack access to public education or have access to a public education that is 
                                                 
3
 Vicky Nanjappa and Krishnakumar P, “The Amazing Anti-India Syllabus of Pak Madrassas,” Rediff: 
India Abroad, February 24, 2009, http://www.rediff.com/news/2009/feb/24amazing-anti-india-syllabus-of-
pak-madrassas.htm.  
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severely inadequate in nature.  This fact causes many students to receive their education 
in radical religious schools that have sprung up in the absence of the government’s 
authority, where they are sensitized to the presence of foreign, non-Muslim powers, 
particularly “Crusader” and “Zionist” presences.  When the Yemeni government is then 
perceived as colluding with the “Crusader” United States and by extension its “Zionist” 
Israeli ally, Yemenis who received these radical religious educations and are unable to 
find employment as a result of their dearth of marketable skills are then more likely to 
engage in radical Islamic terrorism.  Al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY), the current domestic 
terror group, continually targets the U.S. and Westerners in their attacks, having 
attempted to attack the U.S. embassy on several occasions in the past year, and has 
repeatedly demanded that the Yemeni government cease its counterterrorism cooperation 
with the “Crusader” United States. 
In order to provide a causal explanation for terrorism in the Arabian Peninsula, I will 
employ between-case and within-case analysis of Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Kuwait. Case 
studies are appropriate for this study because of their ability to examine the political, 
social and economic conditions involved in explaining the incidence of terrorism in each 
case.  I decided to study cases in the Arabian Peninsula because of the region’s prominent 
place in producing terrorism.  The cases of Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Kuwait were then 
specifically chosen because of their suitability for testing my theory: they are all located 
in the Arabian Peninsula and have varying levels of the dependent variable religious 
terrorism and the independent variables of education, foreign occupation, political 
repression, and deprivation. 
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Data for the study was collected from a variety of sources, including: primary and 
secondary materials about the terrorist groups, local newspapers, and country websites.  I 
also extracted information from scholarly reports on education systems in Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen and Kuwait and previous studies of terrorism in the individual country cases.   
My research ultimately concluded that state education systems in Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen were a major contributing factor to the high levels of terrorism produced and 
experienced by those countries.  Public education in Saudi Arabia contained radical 
religious content and was also structured in a way that led a certain contingent of students 
to receive higher concentrations of this radical material while also being denied 
marketable skills.  These individuals were then more likely to engage in radical Islamic 
terrorism.  Evidence for this theory lay in the conspicuous absence of domestic terrorists 
with technical or science degrees and the abundance of students and the unemployed 
among Saudi foreign fighters.   
Yemen’s public education system has limited accessibility in rural and tribal areas 
and is largely weak and inadequate in others, and is causing some students to receive an 
alternative form of education provided by independent religious institutions.  In the 
absence of government authority, religious institutions have flourished and provide an 
alternative form of education that is often radical in nature.  The relationship between 
these radical schools and terrorism is evident in the fact that known radical Islamic 
schools like the Iman University and the Dar al-Hadith school network have been found 
to produce both domestic terrorists and foreign fighters.   
In contrast, the state education system in Kuwait played a role in keeping Kuwaiti 
terrorism at relatively low levels.  The education system in Kuwait is widely-accessible 
 9 
and well-developed and contains primarily moderate religious teachings.  As a result of 
their educational background and the Kuwaiti state’s ability to hire a large percentage of 
graduates, students locate employment easily.  A majority of students who major in 
religious studies, and even those who have difficulty finding jobs in the secular job 
market, primarily focus on bringing about socially conservative values rather than 
pursuing violent political objectives. 
This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter discusses the existing body of 
literature, presents the theory and testable hypotheses, and outlines the research design, 
methodology and data collection techniques. The second chapter contains the case study 
on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, followed by the chapters for the Yemen and Kuwait 
case studies.  The thesis’s final chapter presents the study’s findings, describes the policy 
implications and offers suggestions for further research. 
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THEORY CHAPTER 
 
 
This study seeks to explain the role that education plays in the Islamic 
radicalization process by examining the cases of Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Kuwait.  
Numerous newspaper articles and individual reports have implicated the role of education 
in the radicalization process, but there is a dearth of literature examining this relationship 
empirically.  Saudi Arabia’s education system has been a particular object of scrutiny 
since the September 11, 2001 attacks because of its inflammatory religious teachings.  
Rather than exchanging preexisting theories for a new one, this thesis argues that 
education, in combination with previously identified causal factors, explains a greater 
number of cases than do other theories independently.  Education plays an important role 
in radicalization because it determines students’ level of employability and their level of 
religious indoctrination.   When students receive a primarily religious education of a 
radical nature, they often fail to develop job-appropriate skills, face difficulties securing 
employment and are more likely to engage in religious terrorism. 
For the purposes of this study, education will be defined along the criteria of 
content, structure and accessibility.  Content refers to the school curricula and specifically 
the religious material contained by textbooks.  The structure of an education system 
determines whether students are organized into different education tracks and can be 
bifurcated.  Finally, accessibility refers to students’ ability to enroll in public education 
and is often determined by socioeconomic or geographic factors. 
As scholars have struggled to describe the definitive features of the often 
ambiguous term “terrorism,” a single definition of the term has eluded much of the 
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literature. For the purposes of this study, I use the definition of terrorism provided by the 
RAND Worldwide Terrorism Incident Knowledge Database and the Memorial Institute 
for the Prevention of Terrorism; “terrorism is violence calculated to create an atmosphere 
of fear and alarm to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or 
refrain from actions they desired to take. Acts of terrorism are generally directed against 
civilian targets […] and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will 
achieve maximum publicity.”4  This definition identifies the most important aspects of 
terrorism, in addition to being operationally useful. I will further narrow my focus on 
terrorism to the distinct branch of radical Islamic terrorism.  Religious terrorism can take 
two forms: domestic terrorism conducted by a country’s citizens within its borders and 
foreign terrorism carried out by foreign fighters originating from that country.  
In this chapter, I will begin by reviewing the existing literature in order to lay the 
groundwork for explaining my contribution to the study of radical Islamic terrorism.  In 
the concluding section, I present a new causal theory for religious terrorism— 
emphasizing education systems’ role in radicalization—and describe my research design. 
Literature Review 
This section of the paper will present and evaluate the existing systemic theories 
of terrorism.  This paper focuses on the systemic causes of terrorism, rather than 
individual or organizational causes, for two reasons.  First, systemic explanations are 
more generalizable, meaning that they can be used to explain a wider range of 
phenomena.  Second, systemic explanations are more predictive than other levels of 
analysis and therefore, more useful. 
                                                 
4
 “The RAND Worldwide Terrorism Incident Knowledge Database Project,” RAND: Infrastructure, Safety 
and Environment, May 23, 2008, http://www.rand.org/ise/projects/terrorismdatabase/.  
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The existing systemic theories of radical Islamic terrorism fall into four main 
bodies of literature, the first of which argues that deprivation creates a motive for 
terrorism. A second body of literature contends that political repression and lack of civil 
liberties provide motivation for terrorism. The third group of scholars asserts that foreign 
occupation serves as a motive for terrorism. Finally, the fourth group argues that culture 
provides an ideational motive for terrorism, which encompasses the religion and “clash of 
civilizations” arguments. 
Deprivation as a Cause of Terrorism 
The deprivation body of literature, first presented by Ted Gurr in 1970, argues 
that poor social conditions, low levels of education, and lack of political freedom caused 
by deprivation are the main motives for terrorism in less developed regions.5  Some 
scholars within this camp focus on absolute poverty as a cause of terrorism, while others 
emphasize relative deprivation.  
The absolute poverty group argues that poverty is directly associated with 
terrorism, because poverty creates conditions favorable to the rise of terrorism in which 
“disaffected populations turn to transnational terrorist activities as a solution to their 
problems.”6  Poor economic conditions are also vulnerable to exploitation by pre-existing 
terrorist groups, and weaken a state’s ability to effectively respond to violence and 
terrorism.7 The main causal argument is that a poor state is usually characterized by poor 
or weak governance, underdevelopment, and high unemployment rates- all of which 
                                                 
5
 Ana Bela Santos Bravo and Carlos Manuel Mendes Dias, “An Empirical Analysis of Terrorism: 
Deprivation, Islamism and Geopolitical Factors,” Defence & Peace Economics 17, no. 4 (2006): 329-341. 
6
 Quan Li and Drew Schaub, “Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series 
Analysis,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 2 (April 2004): 230-258.  
7
 Susan E. Rice, “The Threat of Global Poverty,” The National Interest (2006): 76-82. 
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provide sources of grievance for a population and leave them vulnerable to exploitation 
by terrorist groups providing welfare and social services.8 
A second group bases their argument for deprivation as the explanation of 
terrorism on the relative deprivation theory of political violence. This theory argues that 
political and economic inequalities are more causally related to terrorism and political 
violence than absolute poverty, and is based on the assumption that people become more 
inclined to political violence when they believe that they are collectively being denied 
access to economic or political opportunities that benefit other groups.9  
However, many empirical studies challenge the deprivation camp, arguing that 
there is no direct correlation between poverty and terrorism.10  The deprivation theory 
alone is an insufficient explanation for terrorism; it cannot explain a number of cases of 
radical Islamic terrorism.  For example, the deprivation explanation does not apply to 
members of Hezbollah’s militant wing and Palestinian suicide bombers, who were “at 
least as likely to come from economically advantaged families and have a relatively high 
level of education as to come from the ranks of the economically disadvantaged and 
                                                 
8
 See Rice, “Threat of Global Poverty,” 76-82; and Alexus G. Grynkewich, “Welfare as Warfare: How 
Violent Non-State Groups Use Social Services to Attack the State,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 
4 (2008): 350. 
9
 See Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Inequality and Insurgency,” The American Political 
Science Review 81, no. 2 (June 1987): 425-451;  Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, “Income 
Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,” European Economic Review 40, no. 6 (June 1996): 
1203-1228;  E. Wayne Nafziger and Juha Auvinen, “Economic Development, Inequality, War, and State 
Violence,” World Development 30, no. 2 (February 2002): 153-163;  and Ted Robert Gurr, “Economic 
Factors,” in The Roots of Terrorism (Democracy and Terrorism), ed. Louise Richardson (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 85-101. 
10
 See Daniel Pipes, “God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?,” The National Interest 
(2001): 14-21;  Michael Mousseau, “Market Civilization and its Clash with Terror,” International Security 
27, no. 3 (2002): 5-29;  Alan B. Krueger, “Cash Rewards and Poverty Alone Do Not Explain Terrorism,” 
New York Times, May 29, 2003;  Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malečkova, “Education, Poverty and 
Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (Autumn 
2003): 119-144;  Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 10859 (October 2004);  and James A. Piazza, 
“Rooted in Poverty?: Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages,” Terrorism & 
Political Violence 18, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 159-177. 
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uneducated.”11  The deprivation theory also fails to explain why militant Islamism and 
terrorism have flourished in wealthy locations like Saudi Arabia and the European 
Union.12 
Most scholars agree that deprivation and state poverty have more of an indirect 
effect on the occurrence of terrorism, but that the deprivation factor is still important in 
explaining terrorism in many cases.13  Poverty-induced situations like failed states often 
become safe havens and breeding grounds for terrorism.14  Somalia is a prominent 
example of a failed state turned safe haven and terrorist breeding ground.  Another 
example of the importance of deprivation is how Al-Qaeda has utilized the favorable 
poverty-induced conditions in Sudan and Afghanistan to establish training camps in those 
countries. 
Political Repression as a Cause of Terrorism 
The political repression body of literature argues that there is a linear correlation 
between the lack of political freedom and a population’s proclivity to engage in 
international terrorism.15  Democratization is therefore offered as the most appropriate 
method of combating terrorism.16  The theory states that the lack of civil and political 
freedom creates popular dissatisfaction, which can only be expressed through violent 
                                                 
11
 Krueger and Malečkova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism,” 119-144. 
12
 Pipes, “God and Mammon,” 14-21. 
13
 See Krueger and Malečkova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism,” 119-144; and Gurr, “Economic 
Factors,” 85-101. 
14
 See CCB Kittner, “The Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, 
no. 3 (Fall 2007): 307-329;  James A. Piazza, “Draining the Swamp: Democracy Promotion, State Failure, 
and Terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern Countries,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 6 (2007): 521;  and 
Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (July 1, 
2002): 85-96. 
15
 See Krueger, “Cash Rewards and Poverty”;  Jennifer L. Windsor, “Promoting Democratization Can 
Combat Terrorism,” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 43-58;   
16
 See Natan Sharansky, The Case for Democracy: the Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and 
Terror, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); and R. Wintrobe, “Extremism, Suicide Terror, and 
Authoritarianism,” Public Choice 128, no. 1-2 (July 2006): 169-195. 
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means since there are no alternate channels available to achieve political ends.17  Within 
this explanation, repressive military measures taken by a government in response to 
attempts at political expression are seen as direct causes of terrorist activity.18  
However, empirical analysis finds that the political repression theory fails to 
provide significant evidence to support a linear correlation between the occurrence of 
terrorism and the lack of civil and political rights in a country.19  Empirical research 
further suggests that there is no significant relationship between the occurrences of 
terrorism and authoritarianism, and there is no substantial evidence to indicate that 
democracies are less likely to experience terrorism.  The political repression theory, for 
example, fails to explain why India, the most populous democracy, sustained 75% of the 
terrorist attacks that occurred in the “free” countries from 2000-2003, while the most 
populous authoritarian regime, China, experienced no incidents of terrorism in that time 
period.20 
A nonlinear, U-shaped relationship between political repression and terrorism 
explains more cases than does a strictly linear one; as the level of political repression 
increases initially, the level of terrorism declines, but as political repression continues to 
increase, the terrorist cause is given a certain amount of legitimacy and begins to increase 
                                                 
17
 See Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 379-399; 
and Gurr, “Economic Factors,” 85-101. 
18
 See Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 379-399;  Gurr, “Economic Factors,” 85-101; and Bader 
Araj, “Harsh State Repression as a Cause of Suicide Bombing: The Case of the Palestinian–Israeli 
Conflict,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 284. 
19
 See Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,”;  Abdelaziz Testas, “Determinants 
of Terrorism in the Muslim World: An Empirical Cross-Sectional Analysis,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 16, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 253-273;  F. Gregory Gause, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?,” 
Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 62-76;  and Quan Li, “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational 
Terrorist Incidents?,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 2 (2005): 278-297. 
20
 Gause, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?,” 62-76. 
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again.21  This modified political repression theory might explain why Spain and Russia 
experienced temporary increases in terrorism during their transitions from authoritarian 
regimes to more democratic ones.22 
Foreign Occupation as a Cause of Terrorism 
Robert Pape is the main proponent of the foreign occupation theory of terrorism, 
which argues that suicide terrorism is usually a nationalist response to foreign 
occupation. He asserts that suicide terrorist campaigns are most likely when a national 
community is occupied by a foreign power, particularly when the foreign power is a 
democracy of a different religion.23 The causal logic is that foreign occupation of the 
“homeland” is strong motivation for nationalism and self-determination. The greater the 
differences between the occupying and occupied nations, especially religious differences 
that intensify nationalist resistance by portraying the conflict as zero-sum and allowing 
extreme demonization of enemies, the occupier will be perceived as an “alien” threat to 
national identity needing to be expelled.24 
 Pape’s theory, however, fails to address continued terrorism in countries where 
foreign occupation has greatly decreased or where there is no discernible physical foreign 
                                                 
21
 See Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism.”;  and Testas, “Determinants of 
Terrorism in the Muslim World,” 253-273. 
Abadie (2004) argues that empirical research shows that “countries in some intermediate range of political 
freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or 
countries with highly authoritarian regimes”. The implication of this nonlinear argument is that countries in 
the process of democratization from originally authoritarian countries, and new democracies, may 
experience temporary increases in terrorism (Eyerman 1998, Abadie 2004). Research by Li (2005) further 
qualifies this relationship, noting that different attributes of governing regimes and political freedom have 
different effects on the level of terrorism; while “democratic participation” decreases terrorism, 
“government constraints” such as typical democratic institutional limitations to executive power increases 
terrorism. 
22
 Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism.” 
23
 Robert Anthony Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random 
House, 2005). 
24
 Ibid. 
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occupation.25  For example, the U.S. had removed most of its military forces from Saudi 
soil when al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was most active in Saudi Arabia.  Pape’s 
theory also fails to explain the lack of significant terrorism in Kuwait and the UAE, 
despite the large number of U.S. naval forces, who are even of a different religion than 
the local population, stationed there. 
Foreign occupation is not independently sufficient to explain terrorism, but is still 
an important motivation for terrorism. For example, the U.S. occupation of Iraq is a large 
source of anti-American sentiments throughout the Middle East, not just within Iraq, and 
draws foreign fighters from throughout the region to fight in Iraq.26  Furthermore, Al-
Qaeda, as well as other al Qaeda-inspired terrorist groups, often cites U.S. occupation in 
the Middle East and local governments’ collusion with the US as the reason for their 
attacks; perhaps the perception of foreign occupation is enough to motivate terrorism. 
Culture as a Cause of Terrorism 
The fourth main camp argues that certain cultures, in particular those subscribing 
to the religion of Islam, cause terrorism. This theory is based on the idea of a “clash of 
civilizations,” which proposes that the latest stage of global conflict will occur between 
different cultures and civilizations because of their immutable differences, such as 
religion and language.27 
                                                 
25
 See Mia Bloom, “Dying to Kill: Motivations for Suicide Terrorism,” in Root Causes of Suicide 
Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom (New York: Routledge, 2006), 25-53;  and Assaf Moghadam, 
“The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach,” in Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The 
Globalization of Martyrdom (New York: Routledge, 2006), 81-100. 
26
 See Mohamed M. Mostafa and Mohaned T. Al-Hamdi, “Political Islam, Clash of Civilizations, U.S. 
Dominance and Arab Support of Attacks on America: A Test of a Hierarchical Model,” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism 30, no. 8 (2007): 723;   Moghadam, “Roots of Suicide Terrorism,” 81-100; and Michael 
Freeman, “Democracy, Al Qaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of US Policy,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 1 (2008): 40-59. 
27
 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49. 
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However, subsequent research has effectively nullified the purely cultural theory 
of terrorism.  An empirical study of post-Cold War conflicts revealed that “civilization 
membership was not significantly associated with the probability of interstate war,” 
thereby undermining Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theory.28  Furthermore, the 
theory fails to account for terrorist attacks carried out by secular groups, which account 
for over a third of suicide attacks,29 and groups possessing the same religious or cultural 
values as the attacked state.30  For example, there have been many more attacks by 
Christian extremists than Muslim ones on American soil.31  This theory of terrorism, 
which views the differences between cultures as absolute, also fails to account for the 
variation in levels of terrorism and its popular support over time and does not explain 
why terrorism and its popular support can be found in all different cultures, not just 
Muslim ones.32  
While empirical analysis makes it clear that culture and religion alone do not 
explain terrorism, the rise of terrorism by religious groups indicates that religion does 
play an important role in terrorism.33  Radical ideologies of subsets of believers within a 
religion, rather than a religion itself, lead to terrorism.  The threat to Islamic identity 
embodied by globalization, for example, has been identified as a motivation for 
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terrorism.34  The focus of this study is on religious terrorism, and so religion is assumed 
to play an important role in the radicalization process. 
Empirical analysis has shown that none of these theories are enough in themselves 
to explain terrorism, yet they cannot be wholly discarded. Deprivation, foreign 
occupation, and religion are still important factors of terrorist motivation. Once the 
mutually exclusive aspect of these causal explanations is put aside, it is possible to see 
how they might complement and interact with one another, and when combined with my 
theory, will explain a much wider range of cases of religious terrorism.  
The cases of Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Kuwait clearly demonstrate how none of 
these theories are independently sufficient to explain terrorism in the Arabian Peninsula.  
The deprivation theory cannot explain religious terrorism in the region because both 
wealthy Saudi Arabia and impoverished Yemen have produced high levels of religious 
terrorism.  Likewise, the political repression argument does not account for high levels of 
terrorism in both politically repressive Saudi Arabia and in the Republic of Yemen, 
where the central government is too weak to carry out any significant political repression.  
Furthermore, the relatively constant level of Saudi political repression does not explain 
the variance in Saudi terrorism over time.  Pape’s theory of foreign occupation does not 
fit the case of Kuwait, which has housed the highest level of foreign military presence of 
the three cases, but has experienced no significant domestic terrorism.  Finally, the 
cultural argument for terrorism does not take into account the varying levels of terrorism 
produced by these countries, which are all located in the same region and share the same 
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culture and religion.  Kuwait is conservative Muslim country, but has produced relatively 
low levels of terrorism. 
So what factor connects all of these cases in explaining religious terrorism, or the 
lack thereof?  I argue that education, in combination with the other relevant causal factors 
indentified previously, is most useful in explaining religious terrorism produced from and 
experienced by the Arabian Peninsula.  
Education: A New Explanation for Terrorism in the Arabian Peninsula 
A 2004 study on the causes of terrorism in the Muslim world concluded that “[i]n 
some countries that are governed by Islamist governments, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and Sudan, the focus should probably be not only on increasing years of schooling, but 
also to consider the content of education as well.”35  Existing terrorism literature 
identifies numerous causal factors in religious terrorism, and even examines the 
relationship between education levels and terrorism, but does not discuss the role of 
educational content, structure or accessibility in Islamic radicalization.  Although there 
have been escalating terrorist attacks in Yemen since 2006 and local media have long 
pointed out the contributing role of private religious schooling, no study has yet 
examined the causal relationship between education in Yemen and the rise of terrorism in 
the country.  This thesis attempts to address this gap in the literature by examining 
education systems in the Arabian Peninsula and investigating their role in producing 
religious terrorism.  
Although the main focus of my study will be on education, I will also examine a 
combination of elements from existing theories in order to determine the causes of 
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terrorism in the Arabian Peninsula.  Specifically, I will study the roles that deprivation, 
religion and perceived foreign occupation play in causing terrorism in the region.   
In this paper, I argue that state education systems determine students’ levels of 
employability and religious indoctrination, which then determine their likelihood of 
participating in religious terrorism.  State education systems in Saudi Arabia and Yemen 
are causing a certain group of students to receive a much higher concentration of radical 
religious teachings, whether through a bifurcated structure, as in Saudi Arabia, or through 
limited accessibility to public education in Yemen.  The radical religious educational 
content sensitizes students towards non-Muslim foreign presence and calls on them to 
expel corrupting foreign influences from Muslim soil.  The students who receive a 
primarily radical religious education also fail to receive job-relevant skills, which causes 
them to encounter significant difficulties securing employment.  Unemployed and having 
been indoctrinated throughout their entire school career to believe that they must defend 
Muslims from foreign oppression and influence, these students are more likely to engage 
in religious terrorism. 
Research Design 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the discussion of systemic causes of religious 
terrorism by using cross-case and within case analysis to study the cases of Yemen, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait.  My hypothesis in this study is that state education systems are a 
major contributing factor to religious terrorism.  This means that a majority of individuals 
involved in religious terrorism should have strong backgrounds in religious education- 
whether through a state education system containing radical religious content, or through 
independent religious schooling.  Therefore, if a high percentage of Islamic militants 
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have educational backgrounds in science or technical studies with moderate religious 
content, the proposed theory would no longer hold true.   
I chose the Arabian Peninsula for testing the proposed theory because it has 
consistently been one of the largest sources of religious terrorism and is currently 
experiencing such terrorism domestically.  In 2008, a study on foreign fighters found that 
the Arabian Peninsula produced almost 58% of all fighters while making up just fewer 
than 15% of the Muslim population from the top twenty countries producing foreign 
fighters.36   
I specifically selected the cases of Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for two 
reasons.  First, I chose these cases because existing systemic theories are not 
independently sufficient to explain their patterns of religious terrorism, as I have already 
discussed in the previous section.  Secondly, as illustrated in the Table 1, these cases 
demonstrate a wide variation of independent variables—both those identified by 
terrorism literature and my own—as well as the dependent variable religious terrorism.  
The levels of foreign occupation in these cases cover a wide range of values, with 
Yemen housing no permanent foreign military troops, Saudi Arabia allowing a moderate 
level of foreign military troops (U.S.) until 2003, and very high levels of foreign 
occupation in Kuwait.  These countries also experience differing levels of deprivation, 
with wealthy Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and impoverished Yemen.  They have differing 
levels of political repression: with Saudi Arabia being the most repressive and Kuwait 
and Yemen experiencing much lower levels of repression.  These cases also experience 
varying levels of the dependent variable religious terrorism.  Yemen and Saudi Arabia  
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have both experienced significant domestic terrorism and are large sources of foreign 
fighters, while Kuwait has experienced no significant domestic terrorism and produces 
relatively low levels of foreign fighters. 
Data for this study was collected from a variety of sources, including primary 
materials created by terrorist groups themselves, history recorded from secondary 
sources, ethnographic descriptions, and local newspaper reports on country conditions 
and terrorist activity.  I also used country websites and scholarly reports on education 
systems in Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Kuwait to create descriptions to discover their 
education systems’ content, accessibility and structure.  Finally, I examined previous 
studies of terrorism in the individual country cases to extract information on terrorist 
profiles and provide insight into terrorist motivations. 
Table 1       
Country Foreign Occupation 
Political 
Repression Deprivation 
Education 
System 
Domestic 
Terrorism 
Number of 
Foreign 
Fighters 
 
Saudi Arabia 
 
High until 
2003, 
currently low  
 
Constant 
 
No,  
wealthy state 
 
Radical religious 
content  
& Bifurcated 
structure  
 
High 
2003-2007 
 
Thousands 
 
Yemen 
 
None  
 
Relatively low 
 
Yes 
 
Inaccessibility 
and poor quality 
& Abundance of 
radical Islamic 
schools 
 
High 
2006-
present 
 
Thousands 
 
Kuwait 
 
Very High 
 
Relatively 
low, some 
democracy 
 
No,  
wealthy state 
 
Accessibility and 
high quality & 
Moderate 
religious content 
 
Not 
significant 
 
Dozens 
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CASE STUDY:  
THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 
 
''It looks innocent, they [Saudis] are just trying to teach religion, but in a subtle way it is 
a recruiting mechanism… If a pupil shows enthusiasm, he is recruited into their circles 
and then suddenly, bang! -- he takes a gun and goes to Afghanistan to fight for Islam.''  
-Humanities professor at King Saud University37 
 
On May 12, 2003, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, long an official sponsor of jihad 
abroad and friend to extremist pan-Islamic Saudis waging jihad in Afghanistan, became 
the victim of devastating domestic terrorism.  This attack on Western housing compounds 
in Riyadh was undertaken by the very same Saudi jihadists the government once 
supported and facilitated, and began a period of domestic terrorism by an organization 
called al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) at a scale that Saudi Arabia had never 
before seen. While there were isolated incidents of domestic terrorism in the 1990s, they 
were small-scale, and focused exclusively on Western targets; Saudi extremists were 
primarily focused on jihad abroad and foreign terrorism against non-Muslim powers 
perceived to be oppressing their Muslim populations.  Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers in 
the September 11, 2001 attacks were from Saudi Arabia.   After 2003, Saudi extremists 
continued their involvement in jihad abroad, with a recent study estimating that 40 
percent of foreign fighters in Iraq are Saudi, but also became involved in domestic 
terrorism.  Domestic terrorism in the Kingdom after 2003 was aimed primarily at 
Western targets, but it was accompanied by high Saudi casualties and occasionally 
targeted the Saudi regime.  AQAP explicitly linked its attacks against the Saudi ruling 
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regime to the government’s complicity with the West’s oppression of Muslims and 
occupation of Muslim lands. 
Saudi Arabia’s prominent place as a source and victim of terrorism has made it a 
subject of much academic study, which has produced a number of theories aimed at 
explaining terrorism in the Kingdom.  However, each of these theories is independently 
insufficient to explain the pattern of terrorism in Saudi Arabia.  Those causal models that 
subscribe to the purely ideological explanation for religious terrorism in Saudi Arabia, 
based on the “fundamentally extremist nature” of Saudi Wahhabism, do not account for 
the variation in domestic terrorism over time.  Why did Saudi Arabia, which had been 
relatively safe from Islamist violence, apart from the Mecca mosque siege in 1979 and 
isolated bombings in Riyadh in 1995 and Khobar in 1996, suddenly begin to experience 
the most violent spate of terrorism the Kingdom has ever seen in 2003?  Why wasn’t 
there more religious terrorism in Saudi Arabia during the 1990s, when Saudi nationals 
were highly active as foreign fighters in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya?  Theories 
that center on political repression as a cause of terrorism cannot explain the variance of 
domestic terrorism over time because political repression in Saudi Arabia has remained 
fairly constant.  Since the late 1980s, the Saudi regime had not been repressing religious 
extremism, but was in fact encouraging it by adopting a pan-Islamic rhetoric and 
sponsoring Saudi involvement in the Afghan jihad.  This relaxed stance towards 
extremism has actually been cited as one of the reasons that al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula was able to develop and actively recruit members in 2002, before its first attack 
in 2003.38  What explains the timing of occasional terrorist attacks in the 1990s and 
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escalation in domestic terrorism in 2003?  Robert Pape’s theory that links terrorism with 
foreign occupation also fails to explain why domestic terrorism continued after the 
United States withdrew 7,000 troops in 2003.39  If foreign occupation is not a necessary 
condition for terrorism in Saudi Arabia, what is?   
The evidence supports an additional causal factor in the explanation of terrorism 
in Saudi Arabia: education.  Although numerous newspaper articles40 have noted the role 
of Saudi Arabia’s education system in promoting terrorism and subsequent studies have 
been conducted to examine the religious content of Saudi curricula, no empirical study 
has yet been conducted to verify or dismiss this relationship.  The Saudi education 
system, though freely provided to all, is heavily religious, primarily controlled by 
Wahhabi clerics, and contains politically radical teachings of anti-Western thought and 
intolerance for other religions.  Many students who go on to pursue higher education in 
religious studies experience difficulties finding employment upon graduating because 
they do not have any marketable skills.  While the Saudi government had been able to 
easily supply most graduates with jobs in the 1980s, the government became increasingly 
unable to absorb graduates over the next decade and in 2001, 50,000 Saudi graduates 
were unable to secure jobs upon graduation.41  In addition to having difficulties securing 
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employment, those students with a highly concentrated radical religious education also 
have a heightened sensitivity to foreign occupation by non-Muslim powers.  This 
heightened sensitivity increases their inclination to perceive foreign occupation although 
there is no physical evidence of such, and government cooperation with foreign, non-
Muslim powers becomes synonymous with foreign occupation in these individuals’ 
mind.  This was the case in 2003 when the U.S. withdrew its military forces, but AQAP 
continued to proclaim its intention to expel the West from Saudi Arabia.  The result of all 
of these processes is that individuals who have received a radical religious education and 
then perceive foreign presence, especially those who are not otherwise employed, find 
meaning and purpose in the struggle to violently expel the perceived occupation by a 
foreign power, and are more likely to engage in religious terrorism.  See Figure 1 on the 
next page for a visual representation of this process.  A larger version of Figure 1 can be 
viewed in Appendix A. 
In this case study, I will examine the relationship between religious education and 
terrorism, and provide evidence to support the argument that the Saudi education  
system’s structure and radical religious content is a major contributing factor in the 
radicalization of Saudi nationals for foreign and domestic terrorism.  In the first section 
of this case study, I will examine the structure of the education system.  The system’s  
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Figure 1 
State Education 
System 
Ava ilable to All
Higher Probability of 
Employment in 
Market Economy Lower probability of 
becoming involved in 
Religious Terrorism
High Probability of 
Unemployment in 
Market Economy
Sensitization to 
Perceived Foreign 
Occupation (as 
Threatening) 
Some Students Perform 
Poorly in Secondary 
School and are Placed in 
the Religious, Lit erary 
Branch of Educat ion
Higher probability of 
becoming involved in 
Religious TerrorismSome Students Enroll in 
the State Religious 
Education Progra m
Some Students Perform 
Well in Secondary 
School and are Placed in 
the Vocational/Technica l 
Branch of Educat ion
Individual Receives 
Radical Religious-
Political Education
Individual Receives a 
Less Religious/ 
Predominantly  
Technical Education Less Sensitized to 
Perceived Foreign 
Occupation (as 
Threatening)
Presence of 
Perceived Foreign 
Occupation
No perceived 
fore ign occupation
 
structure is important because it determines which students will receive a higher 
concentration of radical religious material while other students are given more technical 
educations that provide them with marketable job skills.  I will then describe the religious 
elements of the school curriculum and the concentration in which certain students receive 
this material.  Finally, I will lay out the consequences of a highly religious Saudi 
education and the radicalization process, divided into sections on Saudi foreign fighters 
from the 1980s-2003, domestic terrorism in the 1990s and in 2003, and Saudi foreign 
fighters in Iraq.  Evidence indicates that the majority of individuals involved in religious 
terrorism had received a highly religious education, were faced with unemployment as a 
result of their lack in marketable skills, and perceived threatening foreign occupation 
whether or not physical foreign occupation existed, all of which ultimately led to their 
participation in religious terrorism.  
The Saudi Education System and Its Consequences 
Education is an important factor in shaping an individual’s worldview.  As I will 
discuss in this section, the Saudi education system instills in students a sense of external 
threat from non-Muslim, Western powers, and encourages them to hate and resist foreign 
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influences at home.  Furthermore, the bifurcated structure of the Saudi education system 
causes certain students to receive higher concentrations of radical religious teachings.  
Those students that receive a primarily religious education in Saudi Arabia, whether as a 
result of the bifurcated system or specialization in religious studies, become highly 
sensitized to foreign occupation and perceived foreign occupation.  Having been taught 
that jihad against such corrupting foreign influences is the most meaningful pursuit in 
life, and not having been given any marketable skills; these individuals have difficulties 
securing employment and are much more likely to join in religious terrorism. 
 In this section, I will begin by describing the modern history of the Saudi 
education system and how its curriculum became increasingly religious and incorporated 
radical teachings over time.  Then I will describe the religious content of Saudi education 
as presented by textbooks, and teachers’ attitudes towards this content.   
A Modern History of the Saudi Education System 
The modern education system in Saudi Arabia was first established in 1925 and, 
although it enjoyed a phase where secular and non-Muslim topics were taught, it has 
become increasingly religious over time.  The growing incorporation of religious 
teachings into the curricula was largely the result of the Saudi regime’s efforts to shore 
up its Islamic credentials in the face of political and religious opposition.  Since its 
inception, the Saudi state has been dependent on its relationship with the Wahhabi 
clerical establishment and their implicit support of the Saudi governing regime.  When 
faced by political or religious turmoil, the ruling regime often cedes additional social 
power to the ulema, or the body of Muslim legal scholars, to ensure domestic stability, 
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and the ulema have thereby gained considerable power over the education system in 
Saudi Arabia. 
In the 1950s, Saudis educated abroad were returning to the Kingdom to teach, and 
brought with them secular topics and exposure to non-Muslim history.  By the late 1950s, 
Saudi students were learning about such topics as Roman history and the Protestant 
Reformation.42  However, this period of Western-oriented education was soon over.  
Since the 1960s, when Muslim Brotherhood members sought refuge in Saudi Arabia, the 
Saudi curriculum has become increasingly religious in nature.   
King Faisal offered political asylum to members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
during the 1960s as they fled Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s crackdown on 
the Society.43  Many of these Brotherhood members became teachers and significantly 
altered the existing Saudi curriculum.  A former Saudi government official described 
their effect on Saudi education, saying, “They said, ‘This is infidel knowledge,’ and 
gradually their teaching crowded out all useful information.”44  Evidence of their 
influence on Saudi education can still be found in textbooks today, which denigrate Arab 
nationalism and unity movements- the same ideology that had been championed by 
Nasser. 
In 1979, the Saudi government ceded more ground to religious forces in the 
country in response to the 1979 Mecca uprising, Shi’a demonstrations in the Eastern 
Province and the Islamic revolution in Iran in order to reemphasize its own Islamic 
credentials.  The government did so through a number of educational activities, among 
other policies.  The Saudi government began to run religious summer classes at schools 
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to increase the amount of religious education, increased funding for religious institutions, 
and established the Islamic University of Umm al-Qura.45 
During the mid-1980s, the Saudi government began endorsing a populist pan-
Islamism, which propagated the view that the umma (transnational community of Muslim 
believers) was being “systematically oppressed” by foreign powers around the world, and 
that Muslims have an individual responsibility to help and defend those Muslims in 
need.46  It did so as a defensive measure against domestic political opposition, and also 
expressed public support for the Afghan jihad during this time.  This pan-Islamic 
ideology was integrated into the regime’s rhetoric and its educational curriculum. 
The Content of Education in Saudi Arabia: Religious Intolerance and 
Radicalism  
After September 11, 2001, much attention was given to the Saudi education 
system and its curriculum.  Reports surfaced saying that some Saudi citizens accused the 
education system of giving their students imperfect understandings of Wahhabi Islam, 
which was then easily manipulated by terrorist recruiters to convince them that their 
beliefs condone violence against non-Muslims.47  Islamic studies are central to the Saudi 
education system.  A 2002 study of education in Saudi Arabia concluded that “Islam is 
not only integral to Saudi education but also serves as the very essence of its 
curriculum.”48  Estimates of the percentage of Saudi education devoted to religion ranged 
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from 30 to 35% at the elementary level, and 25 to 35% at the intermediate level of 
schooling.49 
The centrality of Islam to the Saudi education system is not a problem in itself; 
religious education is not inherently radical.  However, certain events in Saudi Arabia’s 
history have caused the state’s religious curriculum to contain radical material.  These 
inflammatory teachings inculcate students into the belief that the Western world is 
waging a war on Muslims, Westernization is a corrupting force on Muslim lands and 
must be fought and expelled, and that non-Muslims and Muslims who are perceived to be 
violating Islamic law are valid targets for such aggression.   
The content of Saudi textbooks provides a good picture of students’ curriculum 
since all schools, both private and state-sponsored, are required to use the same 
textbooks.  Even technical schools and private, more secular schools are required to 
include mandatory religious studies in their programs, although they devote a much 
smaller percentage of time to the study of religion.   
Since 2001, a number of reports have examined the content of Saudi textbooks 
and detailed analysis of the textbooks has revealed three consistent themes: emphasis on 
historical and current oppression of Muslims by Western Christian and Jewish forces, the 
need to fight against the encroachment of Westernization and corrupting foreign 
influences in Muslim lands, and demonization of and hatred for non-Muslims as well as 
non-Wahhabi Muslims.50  Even the more cautious evaluations of Saudi texts found 
radical content calling for defensive, but still violent, jihad against forces oppressing the 
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Muslim world.  Eleanor Doumato, the author of a report issued in 2003, argued that Saudi 
textbooks were designed to instill a sense that the Muslim world was under attack and 
needed to be defended.  Although she asserted that textbooks used in Saudi schools in 
2001 and 2002 were minimally aggressive, she also acknowledged that the tawhid 
sections of the textbooks were “aggressively hostile to non-Wahhabi Muslims.”51 
The first theme presented in Saudi textbooks is that of Western oppression of 
Muslims.   In 2003, Doumato’s research on the content of mandatory textbooks for the 9th 
through 12th grades used in 2001 and 2002 revealed numerous teachings on how the West 
is, and had been historically, waging a cultural, ideological, military and political war 
against Islam and Muslims.  The textbooks argued that the Crusades of the Middle Ages, 
Christian missionaries in the 19th century, the Zionist state of Israel, and cultural 
globalization were all instances of the West attacking Islam.  In an 11th grade textbook, 
students learned that Christians are still attacking Islam not only through education 
missions, which are aimed at converting the youth to their civilization, but also through 
their control of weak Muslim governments.  Textbooks also described a Jewish war being 
waged against Muslims and warned of the Zionist aims of world domination that may 
reach Saudi Arabia one day.52  Another 2003 study also described how Saudi textbooks 
blamed Jews or Jewish conspiracies for negative historical events, such as the division in 
the Muslim community between Shi’a and Sunni.  Saudi history books were also found to 
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emphasize the close relationship between Americans and Jews, especially with regards to 
the situation in Palestine.53 
The second theme presented in Saudi textbooks is the need to expel Western and 
other corrupting foreign influences from Muslim lands.  Doumato’s research in 2003 
found that the textbooks’ overall message to students was “to proclaim an Islamic battle 
for jihad in the path of God and in defense of the faith.”54  The call to jihad was framed 
in a defensive context, as a way to drive out negative influences and protect Islam, and 
required the participation of all who were able.  Martyrdom was also highly esteemed and 
was described in glowing terms in the textbooks.  Western culture was consistently 
depicted as being evil.  An 11th grade text said, “When the enemy has seized a place and 
country in which Muslims dwell, such as Israel, which has been set up by force in the 
heart of the Islamic world, then jihad becomes an obligation upon all Muslims who are 
capable of bearing arms.”55   
Finally, the third textbook theme is the demonization of non-Muslims and non-
Wahhabi Muslims.  Examination of textbooks found that they included non-Wahhabi 
Muslims, such as Shi’as and Sufis, in the same group as non-believers and called them 
“enemies.”56  Muslims who work and live among non-believers were considered 
apostates.  Saudi schoolbooks explicitly denigrated Shi’a and Sufi beliefs and used 
derogatory terms to refer to Shi’as until 1993, when texts were revised.57  Yet, despite 
attempts to revise anti-Shi’a material, students were still being taught that Shi’as and 
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Sufis are unbelievers, and Shi’as and members of other religious minorities were still 
forbidden from teaching religion in Saudi schools in 2003.58   
In addition to religious studies classes, history classes in Saudi schools are also 
“heavily influenced by Islamic teachings.”59  The history textbooks teach that 
Westernization causes the loss of Islamic ideals and leads to social instability and 
conflict.  A line from one of the history texts is, “Westernization promotes misery and 
suffering among Muslims.”60  Although Saudi history textbooks communicate the 
importance of popular obedience and ulema support for Muslim rulers, they also allow 
for government opposition when a ruler does not uphold Islamic law.61  It is interesting to 
note that a study of history textbooks for grades 4 through 12 found that 68.5% of the 
material covered Islamic themes, 30% addressed Saudi history, and only 1.5% covered 
global development.62 
Teachers’ Attitudes towards Religious Content 
The manner in which teachers present these textbooks to their students could 
potentially aggravate or palliate the textbooks’ inflammatory messages.  Evidence 
suggests that teachers support the religious curriculum, and do not work to moderate its 
radical messages.  Saudi Arabia has made strong efforts to nationalize its teaching staff 
and ensure their support of Wahhabism by denying teaching positions to non-Wahhabi 
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Muslims such as Shi’as.  There have also been reports that teachers introduce intolerant 
ideas and anti-Western sentiments into the state education on their own initiative.63   
Doumato argued in her 2003 study that, regardless of teachers’ attitudes, Saudi 
students were definitely absorbing the textbooks’ radical teachings for several reasons: 
the religious curriculum is mandatory for all schools in the kingdom, both public and 
private; each school is supervised by Ministry of Education representatives who ensure 
that the curriculum is being followed; substantial percentages of education are devoted to 
religious studies; and the education system implicitly requires student to prioritize their 
religious studies above other subjects.64  This last point arises from the fact that students 
must receive a passing grade in their religion class to be able to move up to the next grade 
at all, while a failing grade in any other subject only requires the student to repeat the 
class in that specific subject.  
Formal education is only one among many elements that shape an individual’s 
outlook and religious proclivities; Saudi students’ perceptions are also influenced by 
informal teachings in mosques, at home, and in the media.65  But especially for students 
who receive higher concentrations of religious education, long years of religious 
instruction have a deep effect on students’ worldview.  Students unconsciously absorb the 
belief that the struggle against the West and its corrupting influences is the most 
meaningful endeavor in life.  When they graduate and are unable to find employment due 
to their underdeveloped job skills, they are more likely to engage in religious terrorism.  
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The Structure and Accessibility of the Saudi Education System 
Education in Saudi Arabia is highly accessible and is free at all levels, including 
higher education.66  The Saudi government subsidizes education so that students at every 
level pay little or no tuition fees.67  Those students who qualify to enroll in higher 
education in the Kingdom are given stipends in addition to fully-provided tuitions. 
The structure of the Saudi education system causes some students to receive a 
higher concentration of religious instruction that prepares them poorly for the job market, 
while another portion of the student population receives a less religious, more technical 
education that endows them with practical skills and prepares them to succeed in the job 
market.  Students can receive the highly concentrated religious education by either 
enrolling in a specifically religious school, or by being placed in the literary track in high 
school.  The Saudi education structure also makes it difficult for literary track students to 
study anything but religious studies in higher education.  When students are placed in the 
literary track or when they choose to concentrate in religious studies, they are exposed to 
radical teachings in higher concentrations than students in the science track.  This 
exposure gives them a higher sensitivity to foreign occupation and a greater propensity to 
perceive foreign occupation when it is not physically evident.68 
Saudi education is divided into four subsystems: general education for boys, 
general education for girls, technical and vocational schooling, and traditional Islamic 
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instruction for boys.  The religious subsystem is designed to prepare boys to become 
members of the ulema and is highly focused on Arabic and Islamic studies.69   
Education in Saudi Arabia also operates as a bifurcate system that separates 
students into the literary track or the science track during high school.  In secondary 
school, students are divided into scientific and literary fields of study after completing 
their first year of general education.  Those who score above 60 percent in their first year 
classes are allowed to choose which field they will study, while students who score under 
60 percent are forced into the literary field, which is largely devoted to religious studies.70  
Doumato further described those students who chose to concentrate their studies in 
religion as the “less qualified students.”71  In secondary school, 35% of school hours were 
devoted to religion for those students in the literary track, studying Islamic law or Arabic 
language, while those students in the technical and natural science tracks were studying 
religion for only 14% of their time.72  
Education above the primary level is not compulsory,73 and those Saudis in poorer 
areas may not be able to afford putting their children in any school except primary school 
instead of working.  These students may then be disqualified from entering vocational or 
technical schools that require a certain number of years of schooling. Students from 
economically disadvantaged families may also be working in menial labor while 
attending school, making it more difficult for them to achieve higher grades.  Those 
disadvantaged students who do enter secondary school do not have the grades to qualify 
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for anything except for literary, religious studies, and do not possess the qualifications to 
enter into technical training. 
 Similar to the primary and secondary levels of education, the structure of higher 
education in Saudi Arabia limits access to higher education in technical studies, while 
religious studies have easier admittance policies.  Access to higher education institutions 
is determined by scores on the General Secondary Education Certificate Examination 
(Tawjihi), in addition to entrance exams administered by certain institutions.74  Islamic 
law and religion are the most popular fields of study in higher education in Saudi 
Arabia.75  In higher education, the concentration of religious instruction varies.  
Departments such as art, history and administration devote 40 to 45 percent of their 
curricula to religious studies.76  Technical universities, like the King Fahd University of 
Petroleum and Minerals, only set aside approximately 10 to 15 % of their curricula to 
Islamic and Arab studies.77 
In 2001, postsecondary technical and vocational education was also available at 
technical colleges, higher technical and other institutions for financial and commercial 
sciences.  However, access to these schools was limited to students who received their 
General Secondary Education Certificate in the field of sciences or diplomas from 
secondary vocational or commercial schools.78  In other words, students who did not have 
high enough grades to be chosen for the science track in secondary school are then unable 
to enroll in technical or vocational higher education institutions.  Students who were 
placed in the literary track during secondary school are unlikely to be admitted to any 
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field of higher education besides religious studies, which gives individuals very few 
marketable skills upon entering the job market after graduation. 
The Consequences of Saudi Arabia’s Education System 
Religious education in Saudi Arabia provides ill-preparation for higher education 
or market employment, because it relies on circular reasoning (ex. “the right hand is not 
to be used for unclean things because the right hand is only for things that are clean such 
as eating and drinking”) and rote memorization of trivial details rather than encouraging 
critical thinking and understanding of broad concepts.79  Historically, Saudi students who 
graduated with concentrations in religious studies were able to find employment 
regardless, particularly during the 1980s, when the Saudi government was able to easily 
supply graduates with jobs.  As the oil boom waned, however, the Saudi state was no 
longer able to guarantee employment for students, and those students with religious 
studies backgrounds were least qualified for employment in the private sector.  As 
religious students encountered increasing difficulties obtaining jobs and the Saudi regime 
was no longer able to guarantee all graduates positions in the government, their feelings 
of anger at the government and resentment of the foreign workers who were getting the 
jobs in the private sector grew.  These feelings and their backgrounds in religious studies 
provided motivation to join religious opposition movements (including religious terrorist 
organizations). 
 In the 1980s, there were two jobs for every Saudi citizen.80  The Saudi 
government absorbed most Saudi graduates without respect to their qualifications and 
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actual skills, and whether they had studied at foreign, religious, or technical schools.81  
This precedent led to the expectation that upon graduation, there would be a secure job 
waiting for all Saudi students.  However, by the late 1980s, the Saudi government’s 
ability to absorb graduates of every field was beginning to decline.82  Private-sector 
businessmen were also increasingly hiring non-Saudi skilled labor over Saudi graduates 
for their higher skill development, despite the government’s Saudization policy that 
allotted a certain percentage of all jobs to Saudi nationals.  The statistics are telling: in 
2000, 78 percent of government employees were Saudis, while only 39 percent of 
private-sector employees were Saudi.83   
In 2001, an estimated 50,000 Saudi students could not find jobs after graduation.84  
The Saudi government was no longer capable of hiring its graduates in 2003, and the 
majority of the new graduates entering the job field were left to seek jobs in the private 
sector.  Considering that new jobs being created at the time only covered one quarter of 
the total number of new entrants to the job market, academic performance and technical 
skills became much more highly valued.  Increasingly, jobs were going to Saudis who 
had been educated abroad or in the more technical or “secular” Saudi universities, where 
they obtained English proficiency.85  As a result, those Saudis who had received the more 
traditional, religious education were less and less successful in the job market, which led 
to feelings of resentment and marginalization.  Youth unemployment was nearing 30 
percent in 2007.86   
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Saudi Radicalization 
 Saudi Arabia has been both a large source of religious foreign fighters and a target 
of domestic terrorism in recent decades.  Saudi Arabia has been a major source of foreign 
fighters since the 1980s, and Saudi participation in jihad movement abroad continued 
into the 1990s, when there was sporadic domestic terrorism and high Saudi participation 
in jihad abroad.  Religious terrorism within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was not 
significant until 2003, when domestic terrorism suddenly intensified although U.S. forces 
withdrew significantly from Saudi territory that same year.  Since 2003, Saudi 
involvement in terrorist movements abroad has remained high, and the Kingdom is the 
largest source of foreign fighters in Iraq. 
If radical religious education is a major contributing factor in Saudi radicalization, 
then a majority of individuals involved in religious terrorism should come from the 
religious track, with only a small percentage coming from the technical track.  It is 
important to note here that religious conservatism is not equivalent to religious 
radicalism; an overwhelming majority of the Saudi population feels upset by the 
oppression of Muslims abroad, particularly in Palestine, but only a small percentage of 
the population becomes involved in religious violence such as domestic terrorism. 
The previous sections described how education and the government’s growing 
inability to provide employment to certain students left one group of individuals 
particularly susceptible to recruitment for religious terrorism.  In this section, I will 
describe the pattern of terrorism in each of these periods and then provide a causal 
explanation for each period of terrorism. 
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Saudi Participation in Jihad Abroad, 1980s-2003 
 Large numbers of Saudis have been involved in jihad movements abroad since the 
Afghan war against the Soviets in the mid-1980s.  The 1990s saw the opening of a new 
chapter in Saudi Arabia’s history: sporadic domestic terrorism and high Saudi 
participation in jihad movements in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Bosnia, and involvement 
in terrorist attacks against American targets around the world.  Domestic terrorism 
targeted foreigners, and particularly Western institutes, exclusively.  During this time, the 
Saudi regime was also highly supportive of its citizens’ involvement in jihad abroad. 
Saudi nationals were the largest source of soldiers for the Islamist anti-Soviet 
jihad, numbering in the several thousands.  Some estimates put Saudi involvement in the 
Afghan war against the Soviets at 5,000 while others put it at 15,000 recruits.87  There 
was also a high level of Saudi participation in jihad movements abroad in the 1990s.  
Thousands of Saudis traveled to Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya with the 
Saudi government’s tacit approval.  Shortly after the September 11 attacks in 2001, in 
which 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis, an estimated 600 to 1,000 Saudis were still in 
Afghanistan.88  Saudi intelligence estimates that a total of 25,000 Saudis received militant 
training and experience abroad from 1979 to 2001.89  Many of those Saudis who went 
abroad were young students, bent on achieving martyrdom.90 
A number of the Saudis who traveled abroad to wage jihad were then recruited for 
terrorist attacks against Americans in Saudi Arabia (1995), Kenya (1998), Tanzania 
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(1998) and Yemen (2000).  Al-Qaeda recruited some Saudi foreign fighters to their 
organization in the 1990s, and began gaining large numbers of Saudi recruits in 1999. 
There were a number of foiled al-Qaeda attacks in 1997 and 1998, most notably the plan 
to fire a missile at the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, which was apprehended by Saudi police 
in 1998.91  At that time, bin Laden decided to postpone operations in Saudi Arabia 
indefinitely until the organization was more tactically capable of waging attacks.  
Saudi domestic terrorism in the 1990s came from a number of sources and 
consisted of a number of isolated attacks against Western targets.  In November 1995, a 
National Guard training site, responsible for training Saudi National Guard members who 
were on contract for the U.S. military, was bombed in Riyadh.  The attack killed seven 
foreigners, including five Americans, and was ascribed to a “local, self-started cell” of al-
Qaeda.92  Less than a year later, in June 1996, Saudi Shi’as with connections to Iran 
bombed the Khobar Towers housing facility at an air base in Dahran and 19 U.S. Air 
Force personnel were killed, along with 372 injured others.  Following the September 11 
attack of 2001, there were also a number of small-scale bombings and shootings of 
Westerners, including British and American citizens, living in Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi Arabia’s position as the largest producer of fighters for the Afghan jihad 
against the Soviets in the 1980s and high levels of Saudi participation in international 
terrorism in the 1990s can be partially attributed to the Saudi government’s pan-Islamic 
rhetoric that, as has been shown in previous sections, had become an integral part of the 
state’s educational curriculum. 
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The pan-Islamic elements of the education system and the Kingdom’s growing 
unemployment left a large number of students with religious education backgrounds 
unemployed, but imbued with a belief in the meaningfulness of joining jihad to protect 
Muslims against corrupt and oppressive non-Muslim forces.  As a result, many of these 
students traveled abroad to join jihad movements in Afghanistan and elsewhere.  The 
Saudi government also publicly supported the Afghan jihad and even assisted those 
Saudis interested in fighting in Afghanistan during this time.93  The amassment of U.S. 
military forces on Saudi soil during the Gulf War in the early 1990s gave some of these 
individuals the motivation to strike against U.S. targets domestically. 
Saudi involvement in religious terrorism during this time period was also a result 
of growing domestic opposition to U.S. military forces stationed in the Kingdom.  Since 
the early 1960s, the United States had maintained combat forces at a safe distance from 
Saudi Arabia, but during the 1980s, Saudi Arabia and the United States began building 
their military ties, and a U.S.-Saudi agreement allowed U.S. military aircraft to operate 
from Riyadh.94  In 1990 under King Fahd’s rule, the U.S. stationed large numbers of 
troops directly on Saudi soil to support military efforts against the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait.  From 1990-1991, the U.S. had amassed combat forces in Saudi Arabia 
amounting to approximately 20,000 troops.95   
Reportedly, Osama bin Laden approached the Saudi defense minister in 1990 with 
plans to bar American troops from entering the Kingdom, and claimed he could amass an 
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army of 100,000 men to do so.96  The buildup of U.S. military forces on Saudi territory 
also faced strong domestic opposition by a group of Sahwa clerics, or the “awakening 
sheikhs,” who argued that the Saudi regime was no longer protecting the Muslim holy 
lands by allowing U.S. soldiers to operate on Saudi soil.97  In response to this challenge 
of legitimacy, the regime increased its material and moral support for jihad in Bosnia.98   
However, continuing military cooperation between the Saudi regime and the 
United States led Osama bin Laden to publish his “Declaration of War” against America 
and the Saudi family in 1996, decrying “the occupation of the Land of the Two Holy 
Places […] by the armies of the American Crusaders and their allies.”  In response to his 
declarations, bin Laden gained a supply of money and recruits from Saudi Arabia.  In 
2001, there were still 5,000 U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia.99   
Faced with such violent, religious opposition, Saudi Arabia initially attempted to 
prevent the United States from staging attacks against any Arab country from Saudi soil 
after the September 11 attack.100  However, after Bush got a new UN Security Council 
resolution on Iraq in 2002, Prince Saud allowed U.S. forces to remain on Saudi soil.  
During this time, prominent Saudi princes made an effort to downplay the remaining 
foreign military presence in the country, instead describing it as “consensual, non-
aggressive, and internationally sanctioned.”101  Despite these palliative attempts and the 
former amicable relationship between the Saudi government and jihadists, religious 
extremists had irrevocably turned against the Saudi regime by this time.  This explains 
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why religious extremists, indoctrinated through the Saudi education system, became 
willing to carry out devastating attacks on Saudi soil in 2003. 
Saudi Domestic Terrorism: 2003-2007 
Terrorism in the Saudi Kingdom escalated to unprecedented levels in 2003, the 
same year that the United States withdrew its military forces.  Direct, physical foreign 
occupation was no longer a necessary condition for domestic terrorism, as the spate of 
violent attacks continued into 2004 and beyond.  Saudis continued to participate in jihad 
movements abroad in high numbers during this time period, particularly in neighboring 
Iraq following the U.S. invasion in 2003.   
On February 14, 2003, Osama bin Laden released a sermon to the Muslim world, 
accusing the House of Saud of “betraying the Ottoman Empire to the British in WWI and 
opening the door to Crusader and Zionist domination of the umma.”102  He also 
condemned the Saudi family for betraying the Palestinian cause to “Jews and 
Americans.”103  On 12 May 2003, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was shaken by multiple 
suicide car bombings on several housing compounds in Riyadh used by U.S. and other 
Western contractors in the city.  Thirty-four people were killed, including 7 Americans, 
and 200 more were wounded.  The group behind the attack, al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), had only begun its campaign of religious terrorism in Saudi Arabia. 
The first devastating attack was followed by a series of shootouts and attacks in 
2003 and 2004, including car bombings against Western facilities and the kidnapping and 
murder of a number of individual Westerners. On December 6, 2004, AQAP infiltrated 
the U.S. consulate in Jeddah and killed 9 people in an attempt to take a young female 
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U.S. diplomat hostage.  The December 2004 attack marked AQAP’s last successful large-
scale operation.  There were a number of foiled attacks on oil targets between 2005 and 
2007, and Saudi security forces foiled more than two dozen attacks and killed or captured 
more than 260 AQAP operatives in 2006.  In December 2007, the Saudi government also 
claimed that it foiled a plot to disrupt the hajj in Mecca.  
The heavy U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, which began in 1990 during 
the Persian Gulf War, ended in 2003.  In March 2003, the Saudi government quietly 
assisted the United States with its attack on Iraq.  U.S. Special Forces were permitted to 
mount ground operations from bases in northern Saudi Arabia, and were given logistical 
support at the Prince Sultan airbase at al-Kharj, but were banned from launching (highly 
visible) air attacks from Saudi soil.104  The Saudi government took great pains to conceal 
its cooperation in the U.S. invasion of Iraq from the public.105  The U.S. ended its 
military presence in Saudi Arabia in August 2003, when it handed over its facility at al-
Kharj and withdrew its troops from Saudi soil.  However, two American military training 
missions did remain in Saudi Arabia after all of America’s combat forces had departed.106 
Despite the U.S. withdrawal of its military forces in August 2003, AQAP’s 
discourse remained heavily focused on fighting America.107  Throughout its campaign of 
domestic terrorism, AQAP consistently explained its violence as a defensive reaction to 
U.S. aggression against Muslims internationally.108   
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Research conducted on AQAP has provided detailed information on members’ 
backgrounds and profiles.  A study conducted by Thomas Hegghamer in 2006 examined 
the biographies of 240 Saudi militants and a sample of 70 of the most prominent and 
active members of AQAP.109  According to Hegghamer’s research, greater than 50% of 
these militants came from Riyadh, although only 21% of the total Saudi population 
resides in Riyadh.  This data indicates the prevalence of urban recruitment and 
recruitment of “newly urbanized youth” from underprivileged neighborhoods.  
Recruitment to AQAP was primarily “top down,” as recruiters sought out Afghanistan 
returnees and utilized religious summer camps for Saudi youth.  Slightly more than 50% 
of the AQAP members had previous experience in combat or training camps for jihad 
movements abroad, mainly in Afghanistan.110 
The majority of AQAP members were in their late twenties at the beginning of the 
terrorist campaign in 2003, with an average age of 27 and ranging from 19 to 42 years 
old.  The group’s relatively higher average age than other militant Islamist groups reflects 
the fact that a large number of AQAP members were veterans from Afghanistan.  AQAP 
membership also came overwhelmingly from the middle and lower-middle classes.  Most 
of the militants’ highest level of education was high school or less, and many had entered 
university only to drop out.111   
Many of the militants were unemployed or students.  While other militant Islamist 
groups have included many natural-science students, AQAP contained almost no natural-
science students.  There were hardly any militants that had been trained or employed in 
the hard or natural science fields such as engineering, medicine and economics.  Instead, 
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several members had university degrees in religious studies and a relatively high 
percentage of AQAP members (12 of 29) were employed in religious professions before 
they traveled to Afghanistan or joined AQAP.  Many of AQAP’s ideologues had studied 
religion formally at the Imam Muhammad bin Saud University.112  This data provides 
evidence for the theory that the Saudi education prepares natural-science students better 
for the job market, and that natural-science students have high employment rates while 
religious studies students face high unemployment rates. 
  Motivations for joining AQAP in 2002 or 2003 fell within three categories: 
political, religious and personal incentives.  The primary political reason that members 
cited for joining AQAP was to expel the perceived U.S. military occupation of Saudi 
Arabia.  Religious motivations included the desire for martyrdom and obedience to the 
obligation of jihad, and to expel “polytheists” from Saudi Arabia.  Those who were 
motivated by personal reasons cited an oath they had taken with friends in Afghanistan to 
free Saudi Arabia, or deaths of family members or friends at the hands of the Saudi 
government.113 
Saudi authorities began a rigorous domestic counterterrorism campaign in 2003 
that resulted in the near nullification of domestic terrorism by 2007.  In late 2007, Saudi 
authorities announced they had captured more than 200 Saudi and foreign militants 
involved in six terrorist cells with plans to attack the country’s oil and security sectors.114 
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Saudi Foreign Fighters in Iraq 
Since the U.S. invasion in 2003, Saudis have been traveling to Iraq as foreign 
fighters in the Iraqi insurgency in large numbers.  In 2007, the total number of Saudis that 
had traveled to Iraq to wage jihad against the U.S.-led military forces was estimated at a 
maximum of 1,500 individuals.  Recent research has produced valuable information 
about these Saudi foreign fighters, who are overwhelmingly students or unemployed. 
A study conducted in 2008 of the declassified Sinjar records115 and detainee 
records from Guantanamo Bay, as well as the profiles of the 9/11 hijackers, provided 
empirical evidence about the profiles of Saudi foreign fighters.116  This data showed that 
Saudi Arabia is the largest producer of foreign fighters, and produces 40% of all foreign 
fighters covered in this study, four to eight times more than the average rate of foreign 
fighters from other Muslim countries.  Furthermore, Riyadh produces the highest total 
amount of foreign fighters.  The study also revealed that foreign fighter recruitment is 
largely an urban phenomenon, and that regardless of origin, mujahideen are most likely 
unemployed or students or common laborers.  Finally, this study revealed that most Saudi 
foreign fighters in Iraq were not recruited through the internet, but by veteran foreign 
fighters; 97% of the foreign fighters studied were recruited through social, family or 
religious connections.117   
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Recently, after Saudi Arabian security released a list of 83 Saudis wanted for their 
attempt to revive AQAP and carry out terrorist attacks in the Kingdom, the Saudi 
government and analysts have begun to publicly recognize the role that the education 
system plays in Islamic radicalization.  In February 2009, the Deputy Minister of 
Education and Teaching for boys, Mohammed Said Maliss, recognized the threat posed 
by radical educational content and called for the removal of specific radical books from 
school libraries and educational institutions.  This effort included removing a book 
explicitly calling for jihad and another about Sayyed Qutb, an ideological source for al-
Qaeda and other extremist Islamists.  Saudi authorities also ordered restructuring of the 
Saudi Ministry of Education at that time, replacing “hardcore Wahhabi” Education 
Minister Abdullah bin Saleh al-Obaid with a more moderate Prince Faisal bin 
Abdullah.118   
Saudi analysts and journalists have also recently recognized the danger of radical 
Saudi educational content. The Saudi al-Watan newspaper published an article entitled 
“Who is Behind the Deviants?” in February, in which the author pinpoints the radical 
content of Saudi curriculum as being one of the dominant factors behind these 
“deviants.”119  Dr. Turki al-Hamad, a distinguished Saudi political analyst and journalist, 
wrote in an April 2009 article, “What other explanation is there for the hundreds of Al 
Qaeda recruits, a figure which represents only the tip of the iceberg, not to mention the 
silent followers and sympathizers. There is a defect – there can be no doubt about that – 
and this is in the damage that has been caused by the educational institutes [in Saudi 
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Arabia]…”120  He went on to write, “This is where the problem lies, schools and 
educational curriculums continue to disseminate extremist ideology in spite of the efforts 
to reduce its impact […] resulting in the classification of humanity [into believer and 
unbeliever] and the promotion of hatred and a culture of death.”121 
Conclusion 
The structure and content of the Saudi education system is a major contributing 
factor in the high levels of religious terrorism originating from and occurring within the 
Kingdom.  Saudi Arabia’s education system has become increasingly religious, 
incorporating radical teachings, since the 1960s.  The Saudi regime has historically 
responded to political and religious dissent, like the 1979 Mecca Mosque uprising, by 
ceding increasing social power to the ulema, which includes control over the education 
system, and by increasing religious activities such as holding religious summer schools, 
in order to strengthen the regime’s Islamic credentials.   
The role of education systems in Islamic radicalization, which has never been 
fully examined in empirical research, is causing certain students to receive high 
concentrations of radical religious teachings that endow them with a heightened 
sensitivity to foreign occupation and cause them to perceive foreign occupation whether 
or not it is physically evident.  When these individuals faced increasing difficulties 
finding employment in the 1990s, due to their lack of marketable skills and the 
government’s inability to continue guaranteeing jobs to Saudi graduates, they were more 
likely to become involved in religious terrorism.  
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Evidence from the case study supports this theory.  Examination of the profiles of 
AQAP members and foreign fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan revealed several common 
factors related to this theory.  Many of the militants were unemployed and/or students.  
AQAP members came overwhelmingly from the middle and lower-middle classes and 
many had only received high school educations.  There was a noticeable absence of 
AQAP members with technical or science degrees, and those that had received higher 
education had concentrated in religious studies.  The majority of AQAP members and 
foreign fighters were residing in Riyadh before they were recruited, and veteran foreign 
fighters were active in recruitment for AQAP and for jihad abroad. 
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CASE STUDY: 
THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN 
 
“[Yemen is] one of the best Arab and Muslim countries in terms of its adherence to tradition and 
the faith … [its] topography is mountainous, and its people are tribal and armed, and allow one 
to breathe clean air unblemished by humiliation.”  
–Osama bin Laden122 
 
 Osama bin Laden recognized the opportunity presented by Yemen’s 
topographical and political landscape early on.  Yemen has played an important role as a 
source and staging ground for bin Laden’s brand of religious terrorism since al-Qaeda’s 
inception.  One of the largest sources of recruits for jihad in Afghanistan and now Iraq, a 
continual safe haven for radical militants, the staging ground for al-Qaeda’s first attack 
and currently home to a brutal wave of domestic terrorism, Yemen’s role in religious 
terrorism cannot be ignored.  Why is Yemen such a great contributor to foreign and 
domestic religious terrorism?  As the terrorist attacks on Western targets in Yemen 
continue unabatedly, it is increasingly important to find an answer to this question.  
The classical explanations of terrorism are not sufficient to explain religious 
terrorism in Yemen: neither poverty, nor government repression, nor foreign occupation 
explains the pattern of terrorism in Yemen.  Yemen’s economic situation has been 
consistently, if not increasingly, dismal since the 1990s and does not account for the 
variation in domestic terrorism.  Government repression in Yemen–including arbitrary 
jailing, torture, execution, and disappearance – is much lower than it was in the two 
Yemens during the 1970s and 1980s, yet it is currently experiencing the most violent 
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spate of terrorism the country has ever seen.123  Finally, neither the United States nor any 
other Western power has based any military troops permanently in Yemen since 
unification in 1990.  The extent of Western military presence in Yemen only involves the 
use of Yemen ports as refueling stations for military ships, a common international 
practice that in no way indicates foreign occupation.  An important causal variable that 
has been largely overlooked in scholarly research on Yemen is the role of private 
religious education in radicalization. 
Numerous articles on terrorism in Yemen have identified the significant role of 
private religious institutions in radicalizing Yemeni youth; one article even noted that 
“the consensus is that the best way to save Yemen's young from falling into the clutches 
of extremists is by altering the educational curricula, especially in Islamic schools, to 
promote science, languages, and geography in order to spread more awareness and 
understanding of the world.”124  However, no empirical study has been conducted on the 
relationship between private religious education and radicalization as of yet. 
In this case study, I will examine the relationship between education and 
radicalization in Yemen and provide evidence to support the argument that the inadequate 
and limited public education system is causing a large amount of Yemeni youth to be 
educated in radical religious institutions that subsequently makes these students more 
likely to become involved in foreign or domestic religious terrorism.  In the first section 
of the case study, I will describe how education in Yemen has developed over time.  The 
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historical context of education in Yemen is important because it shows how radical 
religious schooling was introduced and developed at particular times that correspond with 
Yemeni participation in domestic and foreign religious terrorism.  In the next section, I 
will examine the current state of public education in Yemen, describing its weaknesses 
and limited accessibility in certain regions of the country.  This limited accessibility is 
significant, because religious educational institutes flourish in the absence of public 
education.  The next sections are devoted to describing the regional prevalence of 
religious schooling, identifying prominent radical religious institutions, and 
understanding the effects of education in Yemen.  In the final sections I lay out the 
pattern of Yemeni participation in foreign and domestic terrorism.  Evidence from the 
case study suggests that a majority of the foreign fighters and domestic terrorists are 
coming from regions known for radical religious schooling and that the Iman University 
and Dar al-Hadith schools in particular have produced a number of Yemenis involved in 
domestic terrorism and foreign fighting in Iraq. 
Education in Yemen 
Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East, and according to the United 
Nations, ranked 153 out of 177 countries on the Human Development Index in 2005.125  
Furthermore, over 75% of Yemen’s population is under the age of 25.126  These statistics 
illustrate the enormous difficulties the Yemeni government faces in establishing and 
maintaining an adequate public education system.  In 2005, the adult literacy rate for 
males was 73% and 35% for females, while the overall literacy rate for the population 
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age 15 and older was 54%.127  In comparison, the least developed low-income countries 
average a total of almost 62% adult literacy.128 
The Yemeni public education system is weak, and plagued by corruption, 
unqualified teaching staff, and overcrowded and understaffed classrooms.  An alternative 
form of education, religious schooling, has long existed in Yemen and preceded the 
establishment of the modern public system in the 1960s, continuing to develop alongside 
it since the 1970s.  Religious schooling is especially prevalent in rural regions and areas 
of difficult terrain, where the central government lacks de facto authority.  Students who 
receive education at either public or religious institutions do not have any marketable 
skills, and particularly those who have received radical religious instruction are 
susceptible to recruitment for religious terrorism. 
Modern History of Education in Yemen 
The history of educational development in Yemen illustrates how an alternative 
system of religious schooling has grown alongside the public education system and 
flourished in areas where public education was inaccessible or inadequate.  Historical 
development of these religious schools also highlights the origins of their ideologies; for 
example, schools founded and funded by returning jihadists are likely to reflect their 
Salafi-jihadi ideology, which heavily emphasizes the importance of jihad and condones 
violence against non-Muslims and Muslims who associate with non-Muslims or belong 
to other Muslim sects.   
Traditionally, education in Yemen has been limited to religious schools associated 
with mosques or schools established on local initiative.  This was the case until 1962, 
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when a military government with a secular outlook seized power in North Yemen and 
began efforts to establish a secular education system.  However, increasing urbanization 
and secularization during this time period did not change the “extremely strong role of 
religion” in North Yemen, nor did it alter many conservative attitudes.129  Throughout 
this period, religious schools continued to operate vigorously alongside the secular public 
education system.130 
During the 1970s and 1980s, secular education expanded significantly and 
became more accessible.  The percentage of school-aged children attending school 
increased significantly between 1970 and 1980, at 12% in 1971 to almost 50% in 1981.131  
However, the public education system even during this time was plagued by classroom 
overcrowding, unqualified teachers, and high dropout rates.132   
During the 1970s, President al-Hamdi of North Yemen seized the help of Sunni 
ulema, trained by the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, in order to counterbalance socialist 
influences.133  Al-Hamdi appointed ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, a man of “deeply Wahhabi 
tendencies,” to oversee the establishment of these religious institutes throughout North 
Yemen.134  Al-Zindani was constantly traveling back and forth between Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen during the 1970s, and infused the Yemeni education system with a much more 
conservative and extreme form of Islam than had been traditionally present in Yemen.135  
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It was at this time that the Saudi-funded Sunni religious institutes, also called “scientific 
institutes” (al-ma’ahid al-‘ilmiyyah), began being offered as an alternative to poorly 
funded government-run schools.  These institutes were known for spreading intolerance 
of other Muslim ideologies, and Zaydi Shi’as accused them of attempting to eradicate 
Zaydi thought.136  
Al-Zindani was appointed Minister of Education in 1983, and while he did not 
keep the post for long, his religious schools continued to multiply with large amounts of 
funding from the education budget, in addition to financing from Saudi Arabia.  By 1986-
1987 there were an estimated 1,126 religious schools, and by 1988, 118,000 students 
were enrolled in these institutions, with more than 4,600 of them being trained as teachers 
to continue spreading the religious education.137  Islamist pressures increasingly affected 
the school system, leading to segregation of the sexes in schools, and causing Sana’a 
University to impose an Islamic dress code rather than banning it, as had been the former 
practice.  During that time period, Sana’a University actually expelled a writer on 
development and culture from the school for denying the infallibility of the Prophet.138 
From 1839 until 1967, South Yemen was under British occupation and formal 
education was limited to Aden.  South Yemen began to develop its education system after 
the British withdrawal in 1967, adopting a similar structure to North Yemen, but 
expanded schooling more rapidly than the North in the 1970s in order to spread socialist 
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ideology.139  In contrast to North Yemen, Islamist groups were banned in South Yemen 
before unification. 
When North and South Yemen underwent unification in 1990, the two education 
systems merged into a single education system, and the government attempted to 
standardize texts and curricula and to reform school structure. These changes were 
particularly difficult in light of Yemen’s international isolation during the Gulf War of 
1990-1991 in addition to the country’s profound poverty.  By late 1994, Yemen’s 
economy had been completely devastated by the costs of unification and the loss of the 
remittance system resulting from Saudi Arabia’s expulsion of migrant Yemeni workers in 
the early 1990s.140  During this time, the Yemeni education system also began to 
experience serious overcrowding as 350,000 new students entered into the system 
following the return of more than 1 million migrant workers from Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf States in the wake of the 1990-1991 Gulf War.141  With the economy in shambles, 
many families could not afford to purchase costly textbooks that were then required for 
public schools.  During this time, Salafi educational institutes reflecting the radical 
teachings of the Saudi education system continued to grow until they had reached 400 
schools at secondary level alone by 1996.  Salafi schools claimed to have 330,000 pupils 
at that time, with 12,600 students being trained as teachers “to instruct the next 
generation.”142 Meanwhile, government teacher training institutes had only a quarter of 
the number of students as did the Salafi schools.143  Islamists also made vigorous efforts 
                                                 
139
 Ibid.  
140
 Rotberg, Battling Terrorism.  
141
 Dorsky and Stevenson, “Childhood and Education in North Yemen.” 
142
 Dresch, History of Modern Yemen, 200. 
143
 Ibid. 
 62 
to obtain land and funds to build schools in impoverished areas of small-scale farming in 
the Sana’a, Ibb and Dhamar governorates.144   
The Current Structure and Accessibility of Public Education in Yemen 
The public school system in Yemen suffers from limited accessibility, poor 
attendance levels, high dropout rates, and large disparities between education levels for 
rural and urban, as well as rich and poor, Yemenis.  Even when students have access to 
education and are able to attend public schools, the quality of schooling is very poor.  As 
will be discussed in more detail later, an alternative system of religious schools is 
available alongside the public education system, and those students who do not have 
access to public education or who are disappointed by its poor quality and lack of funding 
have the choice of enrolling in a religious institution instead. 
While Yemen’s law provides for universal, compulsory and free education for 
children aged 6-15 years, the government does not enforce its education policy and a 
large number of children do not attend school at all.  In 2006, only 75% of Yemen’s 
school-age population was enrolled in primary school and only 37% was enrolled in 
secondary school.145  Of those children who do attend school, many drop out before 
completing their basic education – only 48 of every 100 children entering the school 
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system successfully reach the sixth grade.146  The fact that a large number of those who 
graduate from school fail to get a job only further discourages student attendance.147 
Low access to education, low school enrollment, poor retention rates and 
increasing illiteracy all disproportionately affect the poor and rural residents in Yemen.148  
The Yemeni government is plagued by persistent economic challenges and systematic 
corruption, and as its authority is receding into major urban areas, the accessibility of 
public education is largely concentrated in those urban areas.  Access to basic education 
is significantly higher in urban areas (at 91%) than in rural areas (at 78%).149  As the level 
of schooling increases, school availability decreases, particularly in rural areas.  
Secondary schools are available for only 48% of the total student population aged 6 to 14, 
with 84% of urban youth having access to secondary education and only 36% of youth in 
rural areas, where the majority of Yemen’s population lives, having access to secondary 
schooling.150  School non-attendance is primarily a “rural phenomenon,” with rural 
children accounting for 88% of the total number of children not attending school.151  
While 22% of urban children do not attend school, in rural areas the total proportion of 
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children not attending school is more like 52%.152  Many people in rural areas are 
beginning to move to cities to seek better economic opportunities, and this is also 
affecting school attendance rates.  In 2007, many students were dropping out of school 
and moving to cities in order to find employment to support their families when their 
fathers were unable to do so.153   
 There is also a difference in attendance between the rich and the poor in Yemen, 
although the difference is relatively small; 44% of children ages 6-14 from the poorest 
economic backgrounds were not attending school while 33% of children of the same age 
group from the richest economic backgrounds were not attending school.154  A 1999 
Poverty Survey found that the enrollment rate for students from poor families was at 
62.9% while the enrollment rate for students from rich families was at 70.2%, and these 
statistics do not take into account the significantly higher rate of school dropout among 
poor families due to the inability to cover schooling costs, which would further widen the 
gap between rich and poor enrollment rates.155  Poor families often force their children to 
engage in begging or join the labor market, which leads to child labor.156  Poor Yemenis 
are further deterred from enrolling their children in school by the cost of attending school 
(approximately $10/student/year).157 
Even those students who have access to public schooling will receive a poor 
education if they attend.  The country’s poor education system is characterized by weak 
infrastructure, school facilities and educational materials of poor quality, a shortage of 
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classrooms and teachers, and an unqualified teaching staff.  A study conducted by the 
Yemeni government in 2007 found that the Yemeni public education system is also 
characterized by “rampant cheating, favoritism and bribery.”158  The education system 
also suffers acute nationwide shortages of qualified teachers in the fields of mathematics, 
science and languages.  Half of Yemeni teachers have not completed secondary school.  
The Comprehensive Education Survey conducted by the Yemeni government in 1999-
2000 revealed that only 60% of teaching staff had completed basic education and only 
40% had graduated from secondary school.159 
Furthermore, Yemen’s existing education system is based on learning by rote, and 
a representative of UNICEF in Yemen reported that “there are many de-motivated and 
largely untrained teachers in Yemen who are pushing children out of school.”160  A study 
conducted by the Yemeni government in 2007 found that education curricula rely too 
heavily on “rote memorization, outdated stereotypes, and outmoded traditions.”161  The 
effect of Yemen’s poor education system can be seen clearly in anecdotal evidence: A 
professor of economics at Sana’a University and a visiting professor at Georgetown 
University reported that professors in Yemen find that a number of their graduate 
students are unable to even write their own names.162  
Religious Schooling in Yemen Today 
 Religious schooling has been operating in Yemen long before the development of 
the modern education system, and has continued to do so parallel to public education.  
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Until 2000, these religious institutions were operating entirely outside of government 
authority or control and the government has faced continuing difficulties in monitoring 
and managing religious schools.  These schools are particularly concentrated in rural and 
tribal areas beyond the government’s reach, and have played a direct role in recruitment 
for radical Sunni terrorism. 
 It is important to note that independent religious schools in Yemen are affiliated 
with a variety of sects, and are not wholly involved in propagating extremism and 
religious violence.  Mosque schools were long the only source of education in Yemen 
before the development of the modern education system, and many continue to operate 
with the simple aim of providing basic education and religious teaching, without any 
ulterior political motives.163  This study is primarily concerned with religious schools that 
are established to incite hatred and intolerance of others and are used for radical political 
aims.  The majority of these radical schools in Yemen is either Saudi-funded or financed 
by returning mujahideen, and is oriented to the Salafi-jihadi ideology, with teachings 
similar to those in Saudi schools mentioned in the previous case study. 
 Many rural areas in Yemen are beyond the reach of the central government, which 
is reflected in low levels of accessibility to public education.  In these areas, religious 
schools are more important and numerous, especially in the north, where geographic 
isolation often results in limited government reach and societal mistrust of centralized, 
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secular government. Unlicensed religious institutes with Salafi ideologies and radical 
tendencies can be found in the Marib, Hadhramout and Dhamar regions.164 
 These religious institutes exist at all levels of education, including primary, 
secondary and higher education.  As was previously mentioned, Salafi Islamists made 
particular efforts to establish these schools in impoverished rural areas during the 1990s, 
and train their own cadre of teachers to propagate their ideology and educate future 
generations.  Some notable examples among these Salafi religious institutes include the 
Iman University in Sana’a and the Dar al-Hadith network of schools.  Both of these 
schools were established by radical individuals: Sheikh ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani and 
Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi’i respectively. 
Sheikh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, previously identified as a man of “deeply 
Wahhabi tendencies,” has had close ties with Saudi Arabia since the 1970s.165  In the 
1980s, al-Zindani recruited thousands of Yemenis and Saudis to fight against the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan and served as their spiritual guide.  He was also one of Osama bin 
Laden’s “spiritual mentors” in the 1980s, although he has subsequently publicly 
distanced himself from bin Laden.  During Yemen’s civil war in 1994, al-Zindani 
assisted President Saleh in putting down the secessionist attempt of the Socialist south by 
mobilizing Arab veterans from Afghanistan.  His assistance to President Saleh has gained 
him consistent protection and loyalty from the president against internal and external 
critics.  Al-Zindani was also accused of issuing the fatwas that led to the bombing of the 
USS Cole in 2000 and the murder of three Baptist missionaries in 2002.166  In September 
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2002, he declared that all the Muslim lands were “under the control of the infidel 
Christians.”167  In 2003, al-Zindani called for jihad in Iraq, along with a number of 
Islamic figures in Yemen.168  In 2004, the United States and the UN identified al-Zindani 
as a “specially designated global terrorist.” 169  Al-Zindani’s religious beliefs are reflected 
in the curriculum at the Iman University. 
Al-Zindani also established the conservative Islamic political party, Islah, in 
1990, after returning from Afghanistan. The Islah party established its own schools in the 
1990s, and was running its own religious school system parallel to the public system in 
2002.  The Yemeni President tolerated these Islah schools and even funded them at one 
time.170  Al-Zindani controlled the thousands of religious educational institutes that were 
established by the Islah party since 1990, and the schools’ curricula reflect al-Zindani’s 
Salafi-jihadism.171  Yemenis who attended the Islah schools described how they were 
taught that only Muslims who follow al-Zindani’s teaching are “real” Muslims.172  When 
President Saleh began to perceive the Islah schools as politically threatening in 2002, he 
devised plans to merge the 1,300 Islah schools, which housed 400,000 students, into the 
public education system beginning in 2003.173   
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Al-Zindani also founded the most prominent religious university in Yemen, the 
Iman University, in Sana’a in 1993.174  The Sheikh chose to build the university in an 
impoverished suburb on the northern highway of Sana’a, a destination for rural Yemenis 
who have migrated to the city in search of better economic opportunities, and a location 
where political Islam has flourished.175  Although the university was built on land 
donated by the Yemeni government, it was initially funded by Saudi Arabia and a 
number of private Islamic groups around the Muslim world.176  Accordingly, the 
university follows the Salafi ideology in its curriculum.177     
There have been numerous accusations by domestic and U.S. actors that the 
university has its own military wing, which al-Zindani has consistently denied.178  More 
recently, the university was accused by a number of local newspapers of running a 
military training camp to prepare students to travel to fight in Gaza, but al-Zindani denied 
these reports as well.179  Nonetheless, John Walker Lindh, an American member of the 
Taliban, was enrolled at al-Iman University before traveling to Afghanistan to fight.180 
While the Yemeni government has made efforts to either shut down or integrate 
other private religious institutions, President Saleh has consistently shielded the Iman 
University from criticism, only temporarily closing the university in the wake of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.181  The Iman University has enjoyed nearly consistent 
protection by President Saleh because of al-Zindani’s assistance in quelling South 
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Yemen’s attempted secession in 1994 by lending Saleh armed foreign militants.182  In 
July 2008, there were around 6,000 students attending the Iman University.183   
 The Dar al-Hadith schools are a network of radical seminaries established 
throughout Yemen.184 The original Dar al-Hadith school was founded in Dammaj, Sa’ada 
by an extremist cleric named Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi’i, and is one of the largest 
“Salafi Islamic Movement” institutes in Yemen.185  Al-Wadi’i studied religion in Saudi 
Arabia for 20 years, during which time he attended the Islamic University of Medina.186  
Since the original school’s founding, many Dar al-Hadith education centers have been 
established throughout Yemen and abroad.187  According to a Salafi website, there are 
Dar al-Hadith schools in seven areas of Yemen and abroad in Egypt, Somalia and 
Indonesia.188   
The Dar al-Hadith schools are funded and supervised by Salafi donors in Saudi 
Arabia.189  In 2002, the Yemeni government accused the Dar al-Hadith schools of 
promoting terrorism, and deported 70 of the schools’ foreign students on claims that their 
residency papers were illegal.190  Local media reported that there were more than 80 
prominent Salafi religious schools associated with the Dar al-Hadith centers in Yemen in 
2002, attended by large numbers of Yemenis, Arabs and foreign students.191  Local media 
also reported that the United States had information that al-Qaeda militants had studied at 
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these Salafi centers in Yemen.192  In 2003, local sources reported that the number of 
Salafi institutes had grown to 100 and were educating thousands of students from Yemen 
and abroad.193  In 2004, Joint Task Force Guantanamo counterterrorism analysts 
designated the Dar al-Hadith school in Dammaj “a known terrorist training center.”194 
While the aforementioned institutes are notable examples of radical education in 
Yemen, there are many more unlicensed religious schools operating within the country.  
Yemeni journalist Dr. Mohammed al-Qadhi wrote in an opinion piece in the Yemen 
Times that the curricula of most religious schools and universities in Yemen promote 
“religious fanaticism” and “legalize the killing of non-Muslims and consider them 
infidels.”195  A study conducted by the Ministry of Religious Guidance and Endowment 
in 2004 provided information on the distribution of religious schools, counting 
approximately 1,000 institutions, many of which were operating outside of the 
government’s central control.  Although some of these schools were funded by 
businessmen, political parties and innocent charitable societies, many were financed by 
charitable societies with ties to terrorism.  A number of schools were found to be 
financed by al-Haramein charitable society in Saudi Arabia, which Saudi authorities 
closed down after the society was proven to be fundraising for terrorist activities.196   
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Government Response to Religious Schooling 
Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Yemeni government had chosen not 
to interfere with religious schools, and even funded them to a large extent.197  After 
temporarily shutting down al-Iman University in the wake of the September 11, 2001 
attacks and expelling 500 foreign students for counterterrorism purposes, the Yemeni 
government adopted a policy to oversee religious schools administratively and financially 
and integrate their budgets into the Ministry of Education’s finances in 2002.198   
The government intensified its efforts to close down religious educational 
institutes in 2004.  On June 29, 2004 the Yemeni government announced its decision to 
close down religious schools “due to the connection between extremism, militancy, and 
certain curricula that promote deviant and alien ideologies.”199  At that time, the Ministry 
of Education also vowed to reform religious education curricula to teach a more moderate 
Islamic discourse.200  The Yemeni government also announced its decision to cease its 
own funding of religious sectarian schools, which had previously included funding for 
extremist Salafi schools.  
Nevertheless, the Yemeni government announced that there were still up to 
330,000 students enrolled in unlicensed religious schools in 2005.201  By 2008, the 
government had closed approximately 4,500 unlicensed religious schools and deported 
the non-Yemeni students studying there on accusations that these institutions were 
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promoting religious extremism and militancy.202  In August of that year, Yemeni press 
reported that the government had shut down approximately 1,000 religious summer 
camps that year as well.203  However, an official report released by the Yemeni Ministry 
of Endowment and Guidance in December 2008 revealed that there were still 
approximately 4,000 religious schools operating in Yemen, 20% of which lack any 
government observation or monitoring.204  As late as January 2009, there were still 
enough illegal religious schools operating uninhibited that the Yemeni government 
announced its decision to resume closing down these schools, which government sources 
have described as “incubators for terrorists and fanatics.”205  The government further 
announced its adoption of a comprehensive strategy to address the “culture of extremism 
and violence” by educating youth about “the values of tolerance and moderation in 
Islamic faith, which rejects intolerance and extremism.”206 
The Effects of Education in Yemen 
The public education system in Yemen does not prepare students with the 
necessary skills for securing a job upon graduation.  Religious education also fails to 
provide students with marketable skills.  As a result, both forms of education in Yemen 
leave youth without many employment opportunities upon graduation.  Even if the 
students haven’t received a radical religious education, which makes them infinitely more 
likely to become involved in religious terrorism, as Abdullah al-Faqih, a professor of 
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politics at the University of Sana’a in Yemen, puts it, “Thousands of jobless and hopeless 
Yemeni youths are an easy target for transnational and domestic extremist groups.”207 
Young men with low levels of education are often only able to find jobs in low 
wage work, or they end up migrating to find better opportunities.  Those who do have 
stronger educational backgrounds vie for increasingly competitive jobs in the public 
sector.208  The Yemeni government was the largest employer of university graduates in 
the 1990s, but became unable to employ additional university graduates by the mid-
1990s, requiring only an estimated 10% of graduates from faculties of agriculture, 
humanities and law and only 50% of business graduates.209  A professor of economics at 
Sana’a University and a visiting professor at Georgetown University pointed out in an 
article in 2003 that the unemployment rate among university graduates was 50%, with a 
national unemployment rate at 35-40%.210 
Yemeni Radicalization 
 Yemen has been both a source and staging ground for terrorism in the past few 
decades.  Thousands of Yemeni volunteers traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to 
participate in jihad against Soviet forces.  These Yemenis, along with the other “Afghan 
Arabs” were welcomed back to Yemen in the 1990s, bringing with them their radical 
Salafi-jihadi ideology.  In 1992, Yemen became the staging ground for al-Qaeda’s first 
attack, targeting U.S. soldiers on their way to Somalia during Operation Restore Hope.  
Local terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda carried out a number of other attacks in the 
                                                 
207
 Nicholas Blanford, “Are Iran and Al Qaeda Vying for Influence in Yemen? ,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, July 13, 2004, http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0713/p11s01-wome.html.  
208
 Dhillon, Addressing Yemen's Twin Deficits. 
209
 Mutahar A. al-Abbasi, “The Education Sector in Yemen: Challenges and Policy Options,” in Yemen into 
the Twenty-First Century: Continuity and Change (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2007): 392.  
210
 al-Maitami, “Education as a Strategic Deterrent.”  
 75 
1990s and early 2000s, which the Yemeni government was able to effectively dismantle 
by 2003.  Yemenis continued to travel to fight abroad throughout this time period, and 
became a large source of foreign fighters in Iraq after the U.S. invasion in 2003.  A new 
terrorist group was formed in 2006, al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY), and has been carrying 
out violent attacks against Western targets since then, including attacks on the U.S. 
embassy, Spanish tourists, and a Western residential complex. 
Yemeni Participation in Jihad in Afghanistan: 1980s-1990s 
 Yemenis have strongly supported jihad efforts abroad since the 1980s, when 
thousands of Yemenis traveled to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets.  Three 
thousand Yemenis participated in the jihad effort in Afghanistan during the 1980s, and 
Yemen was second only to Saudi Arabia as the largest source of mujahideen.211  These 
recruits came primarily from North Yemen, while Socialist South Yemen supported the 
Soviets and made efforts to prevent Yemeni volunteers from traveling to Afghanistan for 
jihad.212  Sheikh ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani recruited many Yemenis for jihad in 
Afghanistan during the mid-1980s and 1990s.  From 1984 to 1990, he brought 5,000 to 
7,000 Arabs, including a large number of Yemenis, to al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan for 
religious and military training under his guidance.213  Some sources argue that Yemen 
provided two-thirds of Osama bin Laden’s recruits for his training camps in 
Afghanistan.214 
Osama bin Laden himself recognized fertile breeding ground in Yemen, and 
accordingly cultivated ties with several Yemeni tribes, helped al-Zindani found the 
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Islamist Islah party, and assisted Yemenis traveling to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. 
Estimates put the number of Yemenis who fought in Afghanistan or were trained in al-
Qaeda’s camps in Afghanistan at thousands to tens of thousands.215 
 The high number of Yemeni volunteers, specifically from North Yemen, can be 
explained in part by the establishment of Saudi-backed Salafi-jihadi schools under al-
Zindani’s supervision in North Yemen in the 1970s.  As was mentioned previously, the 
President of North Yemen gave al-Zindani free rein to establish these radical religious 
institutes in the 1970s in order to counteract socialist influences.  Al-Zindani was 
appointed Minister of Education in North Yemen in 1983, and he went on to recruit 
thousands of Yemenis for jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s, many of which were 
recruited from these religious institutes. 
Domestic Terrorism in Yemen: 1990s-2003 
 During this time period, Yemen served not only as a continual safe haven to Arab 
militants returning from Afghanistan, but also as the staging ground of al-Qaeda’s first 
attack.  A number of terrorist attacks against Western targets followed this al-Qaeda 
operation, and were only halted by extensive counterterrorism measures in 2002. 
 In the 1990s, Yemen became a magnet for veterans of the anti-Soviet war in 
Afghanistan, and Yemeni veterans were sheltered by the religious opposition party, the 
Islah Party.216  Al-Zindani encouraged al-Qaeda affiliated fighters to seek refuge in 
Yemen upon their return from Afghanistan, in order to continue training in the 
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mountainous regions of Yemen.  During this time, the Yemeni government welcomed 
tens of thousands of returning Arab militants from the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan.217   
These individuals had experience in battle and were indoctrinated into al-Qaeda’s Salafi-
jihadi ideology in Afghanistan, which they brought with them when they returned to 
Yemen.  
Thousands of these veterans aided President Saleh in his military campaign that 
defeated Socialist South Yemen in its attempted secession in 1994.218  Some veterans 
subsequently assumed peaceful lives in Yemen, while others went on to form Salafi-
jihadi groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. When the government failed to meet some Afghan 
veterans’ demands (that they be permitted to enlist in the Yemeni army and be granted 
greater freedom to act in South Yemen against the Socialists), fighting broke out between 
the government and Afghan veterans in July 1994.219  The government defeated the 
militants and either expelled or arrested them from Yemen, but those militants who 
escaped went on to form the Islamic Aden-Abyan Army.  This group established training 
camps in the Abyan province in the southern Yemen, in order to better expel American 
and British presence from Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula.220  Bin Laden also used 
Yemen to house some of al-Qaeda’s business fronts and safe-houses, which were used as 
financial, logistical and passport-forgery centers. There were also several major al-Qaeda 
training camps in Yemen until the Yemeni government dismantled them in the late 
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1990s.221  Some analysts estimate that Yemenis make up the third largest national 
representation in al-Qaeda, after Egyptians and Algerians.222 
In December 1992, militants in Yemen affiliated with al-Qaeda carried out al-
Qaeda’s first anti-US attack.223 They bombed a hotel in Aden used as a stopping point for 
U.S. troops on their way to Somalia during Operation Restore Hope, part of the UN effort 
to address the Somalia humanitarian crisis.224 While the attack failed, it was a precursor 
for the formation of the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan (IAA) in the 
late 1990s. On December 28, 1998, IAA and other al-Qaeda affiliates kidnapped sixteen 
Western tourists in the Yemeni governorate of Abyan. With al-Qaeda Central backing, 
IAA attempted to attack the USS The Sullivans in January 2000, but failed.225  
IAA’s first successful, high-profile attack against the United States occurred on 
October 12, 2000 when an IAA suicide bomber drove a skiff laden with 270kg of C-4 
explosives into the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole in the Aden harbor.226 IAA later 
released a communiqué claiming responsibility for the attack, which killed seventeen 
U.S. sailors and injured thirty-nine others. Eighty percent of the mujahideen involved in 
the attack were Saudis of Yemeni origin, including the mastermind behind the attack, 
Abdul al-Rahim al-Nashiri.227  
There were a number of foiled terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2002.  In July 2001, 
eight Yemeni veterans of the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s were arrested for plotting to 
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attack the U.S. embassy in Sana’a.228  The next high-profile IAA operation was the 
October 6, 2002 attack on the French Limburg oil tanker in the port of al-Dabbah. One 
civilian was killed and seventeen others were injured. As a result, the Yemeni 
government began more intense cooperation with the United States in counterterrorism 
efforts. Throughout late 2002, however, IAA continued their attacks on Western targets, 
trying to shoot down a U.S. oil company helicopter in November and gunning down three 
American missionaries at a hospital in December.229  
Over the next several years, there were several attempted attacks on Western 
interests by different al-Qaeda affiliate groups in Yemen. However, counterterrorism 
operations continued, and effectively contained militants affiliated with al-Qaeda. State 
police arrested many of the mujahideen and released some of them in amnesty initiatives 
which required their agreement not to carry out attacks on Yemeni soil.  
 The commencement of domestic terrorism in Yemen can be attributed to a 
number of important factors besides the presence of thousands of Afghan veterans: the 
perceived threat of Western military targets, the worsening domestic economic situation, 
and the proliferation of radical religious schools and institutes in Yemen. 
 Although the United States has had a strong military presence in the region 
historically, the modern state of Yemen has never hosted a permanent U.S. military base.  
American and other Western powers use Yemen’s ports as refueling stations, but this is a 
typical international practice that does not entail foreign occupation.  Yet despite the 
absence of any significant Western military presence in Yemen, the overwhelming 
majority of domestic terrorist attacks have been aimed at Western targets. 
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As a result of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, relations between Yemen and Western 
democracies were strained until the mid-1990s, when the West decided to reestablish its 
ties to Yemen, and encouraged the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to 
extend financial assistance to Yemen.230  However, Western military targets were still to 
be found in Yemen throughout this time, and were directly targeted in domestic terrorist 
attacks.  Al-Qaeda’s first attack, aimed at U.S. troops stopping in Aden on their way to 
Somalia during Operation Restore Hope, occurred in 1992, before these relations had 
been publicly restored. The first successful attack by the domestic terror group called the 
Islamic Aden-Abyan Army was against a U.S. Navy destroyer. The United States had 
begun using Aden as a refueling stop for the U.S. Navy in 1999.231  From 1999 until the 
bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, approximately two dozen U.S. Navy warships had 
stopped to refuel in Aden.  After the Cole bombing, the United States suspended its 
refueling operations in Yemen.232 
In 2001, the United States renewed its commitment to provide financial aid to 
Yemen and relations between the two countries were further strengthened following the 
September 11, 2001 attack.233  Since then Yemen has cooperated with the United States 
in counterterrorism efforts and the U.S. government has provided Yemen with military, 
diplomatic and financial assistance.  However, both Yemen and the United States have 
made efforts to conceal their cooperation in order to prevent domestic anger.  In 2002, 
rather than stationing any forces in Yemen, the United States moved 800 special 
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operations troops to Djibouti, where they could be rapidly deployed against al-Qaeda 
forces in Yemen.234   
 When Yemen adopted a pro-Iraq position and opposed Western intervention in 
the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait cut diplomatic ties with Yemen, 
halting financial aid and, in the case of Saudi Arabia, expelling nearly 1 million Yemeni 
workers.235  The strain of thousands of returning workers who were now unemployed, in 
addition to the loss of revenue from the migrant workers’ return, only intensified 
Yemen’s already poor economic situation, struggling from unification costs.  As a result 
of its dire economic situation, the Yemeni government could not provide adequate 
funding to its public education system.  In contrast, Saudi-funded Salafi schools 
flourished during this time, particularly in impoverished rural areas.  The Iman 
University, for example, was established by al-Zindani in 1993, with Saudi funds. 
 An important part of the Yemeni government’s successful counterterrorism 
strategy in 2002 was to shut down hundreds of these religious schools and introduce an 
ideological reeducation program through dialogue with Islamic scholars.  In early 2002, 
President Saleh had expelled more than 100 foreign teachers and students without proper 
visas from private religious institutions, including Dar al-Hadith schools and al-Iman 
University.236  The government targeted these schools in particular since a number of 
their students had been directly involved in domestic terrorist attacks.  Ali al-Jarallah and 
Abed Abdul al-Razak Kamal, the al-Qaeda affiliated militants responsible for the murder 
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of an opposition politician and three Baptist missionaries in late 2002, were products of 
the Iman University.237 
Yemeni Foreign Fighters in Iraq: 2003-Present 
Yemenis have continued to travel abroad as foreign fighters since 2003.  In 2008, 
reports indicated that Yemeni mujahideen could be found in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, 
Somalia, and Lebanon, with the largest numbers in Iraq.238  Yemeni citizens have been 
involved in the insurgency movement in Iraq against U.S.-led forces since the beginning 
of the U.S. occupation in 2003.  They make up the third largest source of foreign fighters, 
and have acted as suicide bombers on a number of occasions.  In 2006, a study conducted 
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies discovered that 17% of foreign 
fighters in Iraq were Yemeni nationals, and al-Thawry newspaper reported that 20 suicide 
bombings in Iraq were perpetrated by Yemeni nationals.239   
Estimates for the number of Yemeni foreign fighters in Iraq have varied over the 
years.  In 2005, the number of Yemeni militants traveling to fight in Iraq reached 2,000, 
according to local media.240  The National Security Assessment Project made its own 
estimate of foreign fighters in Iraq in 2005, putting the total number of foreign fighters in 
Iraq at three thousand, 17% of which were Yemeni (500 foreign fighters).241  By 2007, 
Yemeni media were only reporting an estimated 1,289 Yemeni militants in Iraq, 550 of 
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which were from Sana’a.242  Other Yemeni media reports in early 2007 revised that 
statement to say that 1,000 Yemenis had traveled to fight in Iraq between 2003 and 
2006.243  In 2008, Clint Watts issued a report based on data on foreign fighters from the 
Sinjar records, Guantanamo Bay, and the 9/11 hijackers.  This report found that Yemen 
was still the third largest source of foreign fighters, producing four to eight times as many 
foreign fighters as the other twenty countries analyzed in the study.244   
Information on Yemeni foreign fighters reveals several trends: a disproportionate 
amount of foreign fighters are young men coming from Sana’a and many of them are 
religious students, with a number of the foreign fighters coming from the Iman University 
in particular.  Local media reported that most of the recruits for jihad in Iraq were young 
men under the age of 20.245  In 2007, Yemeni media also reported that approximately 
50% of Yemeni militants in Iraq were from Sana’a, and the Mosaik district in particular, 
known for producing religious extremists. 246  A study conducted in 2008 confirmed that 
Sana’a produces slightly more than 50% of the foreign fighter population while making 
up only 5% of the country’s population, adding that Aden produces 15% of the fighter 
population while making up only 2% of the country’s population.247  This data indicates 
that militant recruitment is largely an urban phenomenon and that foreign fighters consist 
of newly-urbanized youth.  It also corresponds with the fact that both al-Iman University 
and a branch of the Dar al-Hadith schools are established in Sana’a.   
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A study conducted in 2008 found that, in comparison to other countries producing 
foreign fighters, many more Yemenis were involved in jihad through religion.  Several of 
the foreign fighters described themselves as religious students, while others mentioned 
that they had been recruited through the mosque.  This study concluded that a majority of 
those foreign fighters involved in Iraq were either students or unemployed, or were 
working as common laborers; 60% of foreign fighters in Iraq were either students or 
unemployed.248  Several reports in 2007 also indicated that a number of graduates from 
the Iman University had traveled to Iraq as foreign fighters. 249  Local security sources 
confirmed this fact, noting that many of the militants traveling to fight in Iraq had been 
previously registered students at the Iman University.250 
Current Wave of Terrorism in Yemen: 2006-Present 
Nadia al-Sakkaf, editor of the Yemen Times said, “There was a deal [with the 
jihadists] but it's not working any more.  Now there are just fanatics who want to be hired 
by al-Qaeda, people who have come back from Iraq or Afghanistan and have no skills, 
who are not integrated into society and have no education. They are brainwashed. Jihad is 
all they know."251  Domestic terrorism in Yemen has been increasing in intensity since 
2006, when the organization al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) was founded by escapees from a 
Yemeni prison, where they were being held for charges of terrorism committed in the 
early 2000s.  Although the United States has been providing military assistance to Yemen 
since 2001, there are still no foreign troops, American or otherwise, based permanently in 
Yemen.  Yet a large percentage of AQY’s attacks have been against Western targets, 
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including Western tourists and embassies.  What has caused this resurgence of domestic 
terrorism in Yemen?  After describing the pattern of the current wave of terrorism in 
Yemen, I will offer a causal explanation for this resurgence. 
In February 2006, 23 prisoners escaped from the Political Security Organization 
prison in Yemen.  Two of those escaped prisoners went on to create a new al-Qaeda 
inspired terrorist group, al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY), which carried out its first attack less 
than a year later. 252  AQY is often referred to as the “younger generation” of al-Qaeda 
militants in Yemen- those who have fought in Iraq and now refuse to dialogue with the 
Yemeni government as militants had before them.  The group’s self-professed goals, 
which identify their ideology as Salafi-jihadi, are to secure the release of al-Qaeda 
members from imprisonment, lift government restrictions to allow travel to Iraq, end the 
Yemeni government’s cooperation with the enemies of Islam (the United States and its 
allies), and return the country to Shariah law.253  The group AQY has adopted a number 
of other names as well, including the “Yemen Soldiers Brigade,” “Islamic Jihad,” and 
“Al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula.”  After merging with the Saudi al-Qaeda 
organization, AQY adopted the name “al-Qaedas of Jihad in the Peninsula of the Arabs” 
in January 2009.254  In an interview with the group’s leader, al-Wahayshi, aired on al-
Jazeera on January 27, al-Wahayshi justifies his goal to strike “all Crusader interests” in 
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the peninsula by pointing out that “Crusades” against Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Somalia have been launched from bases in the Arabian Peninsula.255 
Operations conducted by AQY have targeted oil installations and Western tourists 
and embassies in particular.  Al-Qaeda in Yemen’s first major attempted attack targeted 
an oil exporting port in Hadhramout and an oil refinery and gas producing facility in 
Marib on September 15, 2006.  Security guards were able to detonate four explosive-
laden cars and kill the two assailants before they reached the target.256  AQY has carried 
out a number of operations against oil installations in Yemen since then, of which the 
following are most prominent.  In early April 2008, AQY carried out attacks against a 
French oil pipeline and a Chinese oilfield.257  A few days later, two bombs were planted 
near the Sana’a headquarters of the Canadian oil firm Nexen Petroleum.258 
Al-Qaeda in Yemen first targeted a Western embassy when it launched a mortar 
attack on the U.S. embassy in Sana’a in March 2008.  The mortar missed its target and hit 
the Seventh of July school for girls nearby. Thirteen schoolgirls and five soldiers were 
wounded in the attacks.259  In May 2008, AQY attacked the Italian embassy in Sana’a 
with two mortars.260  The U.S. embassy in Sana’a was again targeted by AQY on 
September 17, 2008, with two suicide car bombs.261 
Attacks targeting Western tourists began in July 2007, when AQY used a car 
bomb to attack a group of Spanish tourists. The tourists had just finished their tour of the 
                                                 
255Ibid.  
256Johnsen, “Tracking Yemen’s 23.” 
257
 Mohammed al-Kibsi, “Al-Qaeda Claim Attack on Yemeni Oil Facilities,” Yemen Observer, April 5, 
2008, http://www.yobserver.com/front-page/10014020.html.  
258
 Nasser Arrabyee, “Second Blast within a Week, Americans Evacuated from Embassy,” Yemen Observer 
(April 10, 2008), http://www.yobserver.com/front-page/10014048.html. 
259
 “13 Hurt in Yemen Attack: U.S.Embassy Thought Target,” CNN (March 18, 2008), 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/03/18/yemen.blast/. 
260
 “Qaeda Claims Attack on Italian Embassy in Yemen,” Reuters.  
261
 Mikkelsen, “Yemen Attack Shows Qaeda.”  
 87 
ancient Balqis temple in Marib. Eight Spanish tourists and two Yemenis were killed as a 
result of the explosion.  The next major operation against Western tourists occurred on 
January 18, 2008. Four of its gunmen opened fire on two female Belgian tourists and 
their two Yemeni drivers in the Hadhramout region, killing all four and wounding two 
other people.  Other AQY operations also targeted Western residential complexes.  In 
April 2008, AQY launched a mortar attack on an American residential complex in Sana’a 
that also housed other Westerners. No one was injured by the blasts, which only broke a 
few windows.262 
The AQY organization’s most recent attack killed four South Korean tourists.  On 
March 15, 2009, a group of South Korean tourists at a tourist site in the Hadhramout were 
attacked by a suicide bomber.263  Another attempted terrorist operation targeting a 
convoy of South Korean officials and bereaved family members in Sana’a failed three 
days later.264  AQY claimed that it had targeted the South Koreans because of South 
Korea’s role in the U.S.-led War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan (South Korea once 
had the third-largest amount of foreign soldiers stationed in Iraq, until December 
2008).265 
The core membership of al-Qaeda in Yemen was initially made up of the 
prisoners who escaped the Political Security Organization Prison in February 2006, but 
the majority of members are young men who have subsequently joined AQY.  Many of 
the members of AQY also have had experience fighting abroad in Afghanistan, Somalia 
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and Iraq.  Finally, a majority of AQY membership is Yemeni, although there are a 
number of foreign militants involved in the organization, including an increasing amount 
of Saudi extremists.  It is important to note that many of the members of AQY were born 
in Saudi Arabia to migrant Yemeni workers, and may have received education in Saudi 
Arabia, which they carried back to Yemen. 
In the wake of the suicide attack on South Korean tourists in March 2009, the 
Yemeni government released a list of 12 Yemeni males who allegedly had been 
“recruited and trained by al-Qaeda to carry out suicide bombings in the country.”266  The 
men on the list were between the ages of 18 and 29.267  Local media reports in March 
2009 also indicated that AQY had been recruiting young men less than 18 years old in 
particular for its recent terror activities.268  A specialist on insurgency in Yemen, Gregory 
Johnsen, reported in an interview that al-Qaeda in Yemen does receive an amount of 
popular domestic support, particularly from disaffected youth and other segments of the 
population.269  He also mentioned that the group’s e-magazine Sada al-Malahem is very 
popular, and copies of it are often downloaded off the internet, printed, and then passed 
around the population.   
As has been described previously, youth in Yemen are receiving their educations 
from a variety of sources, including the weak public system and radical religious schools, 
but most of them are not being taught marketable skills and are unable to secure 
employment, leaving them vulnerable to recruitment for religious terrorism.  Although 
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the Yemeni government has made efforts to close down unlicensed religious institutions 
since 2001, an official government study found that there were still approximately 4,000 
religious schools operating in Yemen in December 2008, 20% of which still lack any 
government observation or monitoring.270  In the wake of the March 2009 attacks on 
South Korean tourists, the Yemeni Minister of the Interior said there were a number of 
religious schools and institutes that “incite terrorism, violence and the killing of tourists” 
still in operation in the country, blaming them in part for the terrorism.271 
Many of the members of AQY have had experience fighting abroad in 
Afghanistan, Iraq or Somalia.  The previous sections of this chapter showed how many of 
the recruits for jihad in Afghanistan and Iraq had been recruited at religious schools or 
institutes, and at the Iman University in particular.  Al-Qaeda in Yemen was then able to 
recruit a number of these militants upon their return to Yemen, because they had already 
been radicalized and had valuable experience in undertaking terrorist attacks. 
These skills are so desirable that Al-Qaeda in Yemen has also sent a number of its 
members to be trained abroad in Afghanistan, Iraq or Somalia.  AQY has been accused of 
funneling militants to fight in Iraq on numerous occasions.272  In January 2009, al-Qaeda 
in Yemen released a statement claiming it had sent over 300 Yemenis affiliated with al-
Qaeda to wage jihad in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia in 2008.273   The suicide bomber 
behind the March 2009 attack on South Korean tourists was an 18-year old who had been 
trained in Somalia.274   
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As Saudi al-Qaeda members have been filtering into Yemen since mid-2008, they 
are bringing their radical religious education with them to AQY.  In March 2009, Yemeni 
security forces listed 116 suspects being sought, including 50 Saudi citizens, for 
involvement in terrorism within Yemen’s borders.  Many of these Saudi citizens had 
previously been included on a similar Saudi list of individuals wanted for terrorism-
related charges.275 
Conclusion 
 While numerous articles have pointed out the importance of religious schooling in 
producing extremism and support for terrorism, no empirical study has yet been 
conducted to examine the relationship between radicalization and the structure and 
accessibility of education in Yemen.  This case study suggests that the weak and limited 
structure of the public education system in Yemen and the prevalence of radical religious 
institutions in its absence produce students lacking marketable skills who are unable to 
secure employment.  Central government authority, and hence public education, does not 
reach youth in impoverished rural areas or regions with difficult terrain.  Education for 
these youth is instead offered through private religious schooling, which fails to prepare 
its students for employment in the job market and, in the case of radical religious 
institutes, also endows them with a radical ideology, both of which make them vulnerable 
to recruitment for religious terrorism.   
Evidence from the case study supports this theory.  In the 1970s, Saudi-funded 
radical religious schools were established throughout North Yemen and in the 1980s, 
almost all of the Yemeni volunteers for jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan came 
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from North Yemen.  Sheikh ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, who was responsible for 
launching these schools across the region, was also a recruiter and religious guide for 
these Yemeni volunteers in Afghanistan.  After the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, many 
of the Arab veterans returned to Yemen, bringing along with them a Salafi-jihadi 
ideology.  At the same time, religious institutions were flourishing, particularly in 
impoverished rural areas, as the public education system faced serious difficulties 
because of numerous economic strains.  One of the religious institutions established in 
the 1990s has produced both domestic terrorists in the early 2000s, and foreign fighters in 
Iraq more recently.   Although the Yemeni government was able to temporarily suspend 
domestic terrorism in 2003 by shutting down a number of these schools among other 
things, private religious schooling has continued to grow into 2009.  The Yemeni 
government has attributed the most recent wave of domestic terrorism to the continued 
existence of these radical religious institutions. 
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CASE STUDY:  
THE STATE OF KUWAIT 
 
“All the Kuwaiti people are against terrorism and its destructive actions. […] Those who 
call themselves radicals are nothing more than criminals and deviants.” 
- Abdullah Fadli, a Kuwaiti Salafi276 
 
 Pape’s theory of foreign occupation argues that foreign military presence by 
forces of a different religion than its host country causes terrorism.  The large numbers of 
U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s and early 2000s contributed 
significantly to Saudi domestic terrorism.  The Kuwaiti state has allowed U.S. troops to 
be stationed and operate freely on its territory at astoundingly higher levels than has ever 
been seen in Saudi Arabia, but has experienced no significant domestic terrorism to speak 
of.   
Following the U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991, the 
United States and Kuwait signed a defense agreement that allowed U.S. troops to be 
stationed on Kuwaiti territory.277  In 2002, ten thousand U.S. troops were stationed in 
Kuwait as part of this agreement.278  Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United 
States had 100,000 troops stationed in Kuwait, ready to be deployed.279  Following the 
2003 U.S. invasion, the United States decreased the amount of troops stationed in Kuwait 
to 37,500 troops and military contractors for supporting operations in Iraq.280  Kuwait 
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continues to be used as a transit point for large numbers of U.S. troops before being 
deployed to Iraq.  If this is the case, then why has terrorism in Kuwait remained so 
limited?  And furthermore, why did the series of attacks on U.S. troops occur before the 
increase in U.S. military presence in Kuwait rather than after? 
 In this chapter, I argue that the case of Kuwait offers a sharp contrast to the cases 
of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.  While education systems in Saudi Arabia and Yemen are 
major contributors to religious terrorism originating from and occurring within these 
countries, the Kuwaiti education system serves as a bulwark against religious terrorism. 
The Kuwaiti education system is well-developed and freely accessible, preventing the 
spread of private religious educational institutions, unlike the case of Yemen.  What 
religious education exists is well-monitored by the government’s Ministry of Education 
and is generally moderate in nature, promoting conservative social values instead of 
violent, radical ideologies. 
 In the first section of this case study, I will discuss the structure and accessibility 
of the education system in Kuwait and how it prevents students from becoming involved 
in religious terrorism.  I will then describe the content of the public education system and 
the nature of its religious material and how this aspect of Kuwait education also limits 
students’ involvement in religious terrorism.  I will conclude the education section of this 
case study by discussing the effects of the Kuwaiti education system: employability and 
religious studies students’ involvement in moderate religious movements rather than 
radical religious terrorism.  Finally, I will examine the patterns of Kuwaiti participation 
in jihad movements abroad and the scale of domestic terrorism experienced by the 
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country.  This data will support the hypothesis that Kuwait’s education system works as a 
defensive measure against religious terrorism. 
Kuwait’s Exemplary Education System 
The education systems in Saudi Arabia and Yemen cause certain students to 
receive higher concentrations of radical religious education and fail to acquire 
employable skills.  In the case of Saudi Arabia, the structure of the education system is 
responsible for this process, as it is bifurcated between scientific and literary tracks, and 
poorly performing students are forced into the literary track, which is heavily religious in 
content and neglects to endow students with marketable skills like those received by their 
colleagues in the scientific track.  In the case of Yemen, the inaccessibility and poor 
quality of the public education system is causing students in rural and tribal areas to 
receive their educations at private religious schools, many of which contain radical 
religious curricula and also fails to provide students with job-relevant skills.  These 
students in Saudi Arabia and Yemen go on to face serious difficulties in acquiring a job 
and many of them turn to religious terrorism while unemployed. 
Kuwait’s well-developed and highly accessible education system and, more 
importantly, its lack of radical religious content prevent Kuwaiti students from becoming 
highly involved in religious terrorism.  As such, Kuwait’s education system is a model to 
be emulated in preventing high levels of Islamic radicalization. 
The Structure and Accessibility of Education in Kuwait 
Kuwait has a well-developed and highly accessible education system, free and 
compulsory for children aged 6 through 14.  The state even goes as far as to provide 
school meals, books, uniforms, transportation and medical attention in addition to 
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covering enrollment costs.  In 2008, Kuwait was ranked 33 out of 177 countries on the 
Human Development Education Index, in comparison to Saudi Arabia, ranked 61, and 
Yemen, ranked 153 out of 177.281  The accessibility and high quality of Kuwaiti 
education prevents an alternative system of private religious schooling from arising.  It 
also gives students beneficial educations that increase their employability.   
 The public education system in Kuwait is divided into four categories: general, 
vocational, religious, and special education for adult literacy and the handicapped.  All 
types of school in Kuwait begin with four years of primary education.  Following primary 
schooling, those students in the general education program go on to four more years of 
intermediate and then another four years of secondary schooling, during which, students 
go into one of two tracks: science or non-science.282  Both of these tracks receive the 
same amount of religious education, and the differences in their curriculum will be 
discussed in the next section.  There is an alternative structure of general education at the 
secondary level, which was introduced in 1978.  This system is called the “unit system” 
and instead of dividing students into the science and non-science tracks, gives students 
eight different options of subjects to study.283 
Higher education is provided by Kuwait University primarily, in addition to 
applied colleges and private post-secondary colleges and universities, such as the 
American University of Kuwait and the Gulf University for Science and Technology.  In 
order to enroll at Kuwait University or the applied colleges, students need only graduate 
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with a score of 50% total and in each individual subject from secondary school.  Applied 
education is sponsored by the Public Authority of Applied Education and Training, and is 
divided into the College of Basic Education for training teachers, the College of Business 
Studies, the College of Health Sciences, and the College of Technical Studies.  Kuwait 
University was established in 1966, and offers a Bachelor of Arts or a Bachelor of 
Sciences in a number of different majors.284 
There are also a number of private schools in Kuwait that operate under 
government supervision through the Ministry of Education.  These private schools were 
originally established in order to accommodate foreign workers and their families, who 
are not entitled to receive free education in Kuwait.285  There are several categories of 
private education, including: Arabic private schools, foreign private schools (British, 
American, Indian, etc.), and cultural institutes specializing in training, vocational and 
career studies.286 
Public education in Kuwait is widely accessible.  Eighty-seven percent of school-
aged children were attending primary school in 1999, and 83% were attending in 2006.  
In 2006, 91% of children were completing a full course of primary school.  Both youth 
and adult literacy rates in Kuwait are more than 10% higher than the regional average.287 
The Content of Education in Kuwait 
 School curricula in Kuwait does contain mandatory religious education at every 
level, however, this religious material is largely focused on conservative social values 
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rather than radical political ideologies.  Mainstream Islamists of a moderate nature have 
been closely involved with education in the past decades, but the vast majority of them 
have consistently denounced religious violence and terrorism.   
Although students in Kuwait may be divided between the science and non-science 
tracks, the religious content of their education is the same and is similarly concentrated in 
both tracks.  The curriculum at the primary level is the same in all categories of public 
education, apart from special education.  It consists of Arabic language, Islamic studies, 
mathematics, social studies, physical education, music and arts.  At the intermediate 
level, which last for four years, students in general education study the same subjects as 
they did at the primary level, in addition to civics, applied studies, and English language.  
The secondary level of general education also lasts for four years and is divided into two 
tracks during the third year: the science and the non-science track.288   
For the first two years of secondary education, all students study Islamic studies, 
Arabic, French and English language, mathematics, sciences, social studies, art and 
computer studies.  The amount of time spent on Arabic and Islamic studies is the same 
for both tracks; the only difference between the two tracks is that those students in the 
science track study mathematics, biology, physics and chemistry while their non-science 
schoolmates study history, geography, psychology, and logic and philosophy.  Students 
in the vocational school system also study Islamic studies, Arabic and English Language, 
social studies, mathematics and sciences, in addition to their specialized technical or 
vocational classes.289 
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Religious education in Kuwait requires 8 years of study after the 4 years of 
primary school, divided into intermediary and secondary education. Slightly more than 
50% of class time at the intermediary level is devoted to Islamic studies and Arabic 
language.  At the secondary level, roughly two-thirds of instruction is devoted to Islamic 
studies and Arabic language.  Students enrolled in religious schools also study English, 
mathematics, social studies, and sciences.290 
Although religious studies are included throughout the state curriculum and 
students have the opportunity to enroll in religious schools, the religious content of 
Kuwaiti education is primarily non-radical in nature.  Islamists have exercised a 
considerable amount of influence over the education system, but their major concerns 
have focused on conservative societal values, such as gender segregation in school, rather 
than radical political campaigns to engage in violence. 
In the late 1970s, there was a movement to Islamize Kuwait as Islamists became 
part of the Ministry of Education, where they encouraged the growth of Islamic studies 
and influenced which texts were being taught in public schools.291  In 1981, Islamization 
gained speed when Islamists won elections for parliamentary seats and joined with tribal 
leaders to promote their political goals.292  There were three dominant groups of Islamists 
involved in Kuwaiti parliament in the late 1990s: The Islamic Constitutional Movement 
(ICM), the Islamic Popular Alliance (IPA), and the Islamic National Alliance.  The ICM 
and IPA were Sunni organizations focused on reducing corruption and encouraging 
Islamic values and did not articulate any intentions towards radical reform.  On the 
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contrary, the ICM was devoted to preserving the traditional social order and creating a 
more socially conservative state.   
The issue of gender segregation in education has been a consistent source of 
controversy in Kuwait.  In 1996, Islamists and conservatives in Kuwait’s parliament 
passed a law requiring males and females to be separated at Kuwait University and other 
institutions of higher learning.293  In 2000, this law was extended to private universities as 
well, and in 2008, a senior liberal MP received a death threat in response to his proposed 
amendment of these two laws enforcing gender segregation at universities.294 
Mainstream Islamists have also directly interfered in school curricula on a number 
of occasions, although their interference was not related to violence or terrorism.  For 
example, in 2007, the Ministry of Education decided to remove Article 18 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights from the high school curriculum to appease 
Islamists.295  Article 18 states that everyone has the right to freedom of religion, including 
the freedom to change his or her religious beliefs.  Islamic studies textbooks also teach 
Islam from a Sunni interpretation and have included passages declaring some Shi’a 
religious practices as heretical.296  In 2008, Shi’a leaders called on the Ministry of 
Education to remove these references, and a governmental committee was formed to 
examine this issue.297   
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Westernized liberals in Kuwait have criticized Islamic studies textbooks in the 
state education system for encouraging religious extremism.298  They also pointed out 
that teachers at state-run religious schools were coming from very conservative religious 
groups such as the Social Reform Society.299  However, examination by the media 
reveals a large difference between religious textbook content in Kuwait and religious 
content in Saudi textbooks: Kuwaiti textbooks do espouse Islam as the “only religion that 
leads to happiness in this world and the afterlife,” but do not incite violence against other 
religious groups or the West, as do Saudi textbooks.300  Absolute statements on religious 
legitimacy do not particularly indicate radicalism, but rather reflect the religious and 
social conservatism of a large portion of the Kuwaiti population. 
In 2002, the Kuwaiti government announced that it would be revising the Islamic 
content of state education, with assistance from the newly-formed Security Strategy 
Committee, to “develop and modernize school curricula” in the wake of unprecedented 
attacks on U.S. troops stationed in Kuwait.301  However, the education minister stressed 
the fact that state textbooks and curricula at the time did not promote terrorism or hatred 
for others.  Instead, the Ministry of Education wanted to review educational materials to 
ensure that they could not be misinterpreted.  In 2003, the Kuwaiti government removed 
a number of schoolteachers from the education system for propagating extremist 
ideology.302  Reflecting the government’s goals to emphasize moderation and tolerance in 
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Islam, revised texts in 2005 stated that all religions “hate brutality.”303  In 2007, Dr. 
Nuriyah al-Sbeih304 was elected as the Kuwaiti Education Minister and she refused to 
wear a veil in parliamentary sessions.  While she was criticized by Islamist MPs, Kuwaiti 
media published numerous articles in support of her right to choose whether or not to 
veil.305  In March 2009, the Kuwaiti religious authority, the Ministry of Awqaf, was 
making major efforts to promote moderation and dialogue.306 
In addition to the moderate religious teachings of the Kuwait curriculum, the 
teaching staff holds largely moderate religious beliefs.  The majority of Kuwaiti society is 
open and tolerant of other religions.  Furthermore, most Kuwaitis have more benign 
views of America than do citizens of other countries in the region, and even perceive the 
more than 25,000 U.S. troops stationed in Kuwait as a necessary line of defense against 
external threats.307  This positive attitude towards the United States is largely a result of 
the United States’ role in liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991.  Another 
Kuwaiti Salafi said in an interview, “We support stability and it is very important for the 
American forces to stay for the time being.”308  However, despite the fact that Kuwaitis 
hold some of the most pro-U.S. attitude in the Gulf region, there is still considerable 
popular dissatisfaction with the U.S. policy towards the Palestine-Israel conflict.309 
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There is a minority of ultraconservatives in Kuwait who oppose the presence of 
non-Muslim groups in Kuwait, including a number of extremist Salafis.  There are only a 
small amount of Salafi-jihadists in Kuwait that make up a “radical fringe” and are not 
only suppressed by the government, but are also criticized by both urban liberals and 
mainstream Islamists who are involved in parliament.310  There have also been a number 
of radical Islamists who have promoted violence and jihad, but the Kuwaiti government 
has exiled these individuals or banned them from preaching.  For example, Hamid bin 
Abdallah al-Ali, an influential Salafi-jihadi cleric in Kuwait and a former professor of 
Islamic studies at Kuwait University, was arrested and officially banned from teaching or 
speaking in any Kuwaiti institutions when he issued fatwas calling for jihad against the 
Kuwaiti state and other Arab government “apostates” for supporting non-Islamic 
countries’ aggression against Muslims in 1999. 311  The majority of the Salafis in Kuwait 
denounce terrorism and violence.  
The Effects of the Kuwaiti Education System 
The Kuwait education system primarily produces employable students and in instances 
where religious studies students are unable to secure employment, they become involved 
in Islamist movements devoted to conservative social values rather than radical religious 
ideologies.   
Unlike students in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Kuwaiti students have high 
employment rates, which increase with the level of education. Unemployment rates in 
Kuwait have remained low throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.  From 1993-2004 
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unemployment in Kuwait ranged between 1-2%.312  Approximately 50% of 
unemployment was made up of those with only primary education, while those with 
secondary education made up only 11-13% of the unemployed from 1996 until 2001.313  
During this time period, those with tertiary education only made up 3% of the 
unemployed.314  While unemployment did begin to rise for Kuwaitis with secondary and 
tertiary education in 2002, and reached a pinnacle of 7% unemployment in 2003, 
unemployment rates have remained relatively low overall, at 2-4%.  Low unemployment 
rates in Kuwait are largely due to the fact that the government is able to employ around 
90% of the national labor force.315 
While there are a number of students majoring in Islamic studies who are unable 
to obtain employment in secular fields of work because of their lack of technical or 
vocational skills, they represent a small minority of Kuwait’s population, and are 
primarily concerned with social issues rather than political violence.  By 2001, Islamists 
holding influential positions in the Ministry of Education had been able to shape the 
education system to produce a number of graduates with ample experience in religious 
studies, but lacking the skills needed to get a secular job.  These young men became the 
primary constituency for Islamist movements because of the Islamists’ stance on gender 
segregation and the role of women in society: young men were angry that young women 
were performing better than they were, so supported Islamism for its promise to segregate 
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schools and limit women’s ability to participate in the workplace because they wanted to 
improve their chances of success in school and later in the job market.316   
The Lack of Kuwaiti Terrorism 
Kuwaitis have been involved in jihad movements abroad, but their numbers have 
been relatively low compared to other countries in the region.  Furthermore, despite the 
substantial and consistent presence of U.S. military forces stationed in Kuwait, domestic 
terrorism in Kuwait has remained very limited.  Even as the numbers of U.S. troops 
stationed in Kuwait remained high in the years following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 
2003, no terror attacks have been carried out against these forces since then.   
Limited Kuwaiti Involvement in Jihad Abroad 
 While thousands of Saudis and Yemenis volunteered for the jihad against Soviets 
in Afghanistan in the 1980s, only dozens of Kuwaitis did the same.  Kuwaiti volunteers 
for jihad abroad in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Iraq have been limited and only make up a 
small minority of religious foreign fighters abroad.  Kuwait has been a greater source of 
funding for jihad abroad, through private religious charities, than it has been a source of 
fighters. 
Many Kuwaitis traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s for jihad, although there 
were not near the level of Kuwaiti volunteers as there were Saudi and Yemeni.317  There 
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were about 120 surviving Kuwaiti veterans of the 1980s anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan 
in 2005, and they were very closely monitored by Kuwaiti security forces.318 
After participating in the armed resistance to the Iraqi occupation forces, “scores” of 
Kuwaitis went on to join the jihads in Chechnya, Bosnia, post-September 11 
Afghanistan, and currently, Iraq.319   
 In 2001, when the U.S. launched airstrikes on al-Qaeda infrastructure in 
Afghanistan, there were approximately 150 Kuwaitis in the al-Qaeda training camps.320  
Of the 100 who survived (50 were killed in the airstrikes), many fled to Pakistan or Iran 
and some traveled onto Iraq after 2003, or made their way back into Kuwait.321  In 2006, 
there were still reports coming in that Kuwaitis were found among al-Qaeda fighters in 
Afghanistan killed in clashes with American forces.322  More recently, in March 2008, a 
retired Kuwaiti pop star announced his decision to renounce the “sin” of the music 
industry in order to join al-Qaeda and the Taliban in fighting jihad against foreign 
troops.323  As recent as January 2009, a Saudi al-Qaeda operative was arrested in Kuwait 
and admitted to having recruited 20 Kuwaiti young men to travel to Afghanistan to wage 
jihad against NATO forces.324 
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While Saudis are estimated to make up more than 40% of foreign fighters in Iraq, 
Kuwaitis make up less than 1% of the foreign fighters.325  Kuwait produces less than half 
as many foreign fighters in Iraq as Saudi Arabia and Yemen produce.326  However, 
Salafi-jihadi figures in Kuwait were able to establish a recruiting and transportation 
infrastructure in 2003 to send would-be mujahideen to Iraq through Syria.327  In July 
2004, three Kuwaiti teenagers were arrested in Damascus for trying to enter Iraq illegally, 
and were sent back home.328  In early 2005, reports indicated that dozens of Kuwaitis had 
joined al-Qaeda in Iraq, and up to 11 of them had died in suicide missions.329  Also in 
early 2005, 22 Kuwaitis were put on trial for recruiting and transporting volunteers to 
Iraq.330  In 2008, a Kuwaiti Sunni extremist named Mubarak al-Bathali admitted in an 
interview with a local newspaper that he had personally sent Kuwaiti fighters to Iraq 
through Syria; he was detained by Kuwaiti security forces following the interview.331  
Also in 2008, the U.S. ambassador to Kuwait expressed her concern over continued 
Kuwaiti funding of foreign fighters in Iraq.332 
 In addition to the tens of Kuwaitis who participated in jihad movements abroad, 
there have been a few prominent Kuwaitis involved in al-Qaeda’s work abroad.  One of 
the Kuwaitis who were integral to al-Qaeda’s early work is Ramzi Yousef, born in 
Kuwait of Pakistani descent, who became the chief bomb-maker in the 1993 World Trade 
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Center bombing.333  Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, another Kuwaiti, served as a senior official 
spokesman for al-Qaeda, and was arrested by Iranian authorities in 2003 after pressure 
from Kuwait to extradite him.  It is unclear whether he is still in Iranian custody or not. 
Finally, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the alleged mastermind behind the September 11, 
2001 attacks, was born in Kuwait to Pakistani parents from Baluchistan.  He studied in 
Kuwait until the age of 16, then joined the Muslim Brotherhood and traveled to Pakistan 
and the United States for study.  He was captured in a safe house in Pakistan in 2003, and 
has been in U.S. custody since.334 
Domestic Terrorism in Kuwait 
Although Kuwait experienced a violent bout of Iranian-backed domestic terrorism 
in the early 1980s, domestic terror groups in Kuwait have remained largely unorganized 
and isolated.  The amount of Kuwaitis intent upon engaging in religious terrorism has 
been described as a “very small minority.”335  This minority has been unable to carry out 
any serious terrorist attacks and has been largely prevented from connecting with the 
wider jihadi network and the broader al-Qaeda network or even with one another because 
of the tight surveillance by Kuwait security.336  The height of domestic terrorism in 
Kuwait since the 1980s occurred in late 2002 and early 2003 when there was a series of 
shootings against U.S. military targets.  Since then, Kuwaiti security forces have 
uncovered many plans to attack government and Western targets and facilities, but none 
of these plans, despite their increasing level of maturity, have reached fruition. 
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Iranian-backed domestic terrorism in Kuwait was at its peak in 1983, when 
Muslim extremists drove car bombs into six targets, including the U.S. and French 
embassies.  After the Kuwaiti government arrested the extremists, Iranian-backed radicals 
launched another set of attacks to pressure Kuwait to release the prisoners, hijacking a 
Kuwaiti plane and killing two of its passengers, driving a car into the Emir’s motorcade, 
and planting 2 bombs in Kuwaiti cafes.337  Throughout this episode, the Emir remained 
firm in his commitment to refuse negotiations with terrorists. 
Since then, domestic terror groups have remained “scattered and isolated”- only 
able to form basic cells and carry out amateur attacks striking accessible targets with 
basic weaponry without any apparent comprehensive planning.338  The only terror 
activity they were able to carry out resulted in a haphazard series of shootings at U.S. 
troops stationed in Kuwait that led to only two deaths.  This series of attacks on U.S. 
soldiers stationed in Kuwait occurred during the buildup to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 
2002-2003.339  In the most fatal of the attacks, two Kuwaiti extremists, who had been 
trained in Afghanistan, shot U.S. Marines on Failaka island on October 8, killing one 
Marine and wounding another.340  At this time, another young Kuwaiti attempted to 
launch an attack on a residential complex for Western businessmen, claiming to have 
received his instructions through the internet from al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan.341 
However, the vast majority of their plans were successfully apprehended and prevented 
by Kuwaiti security forces. 
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 In early 2005 a sequence of raids on militant hideouts revealed a more threatening 
network of Kuwaiti terrorists than ever before: there was a well-developed cell structure, 
including a bomb-making shop in Kuwait City, and an increased interconnectedness 
between Kuwaiti terror cells and regional Salafist movements.342  Security forces 
uncovered plans to target the Kuwait security agency headquarters, oil facilities, and U.S. 
installations.  In the ensuing battles between security forces and militants, 17 Kuwaitis 
were arrested along with 15 other suspects.343  The terror cell, dismantled by security 
forces in early 2005, included Kuwaiti, Saudi, Jordanian, Yemeni nationals, as well as a 
number of stateless Arabs.344   
During the same time period in early 2005, Saudi terrorists from the al-Qaeda 
Organization of the Arabian Peninsula were reported to be entering Kuwait and assisting 
with the development of domestic terror cells, and a number of domestic terror groups 
were found to have links to Saudi groups.345  These groups used a number of different 
names, including the “Peninsula Lion Brigades” and the “Brigade of the Two Shrines,” 
and the “Sharia Falcons Squadron.”346  However, these terror cells were never able to 
even come close to carrying out any violence on Kuwaiti soil. 
 Although the Interior Ministry of Kuwait declared a high state of alert in March 
2009 after intelligence warnings about al-Qaeda threats to attack the Saudi Arabian 
airlines to and from Kuwait, Kuwait is considered an example in successful 
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counterterrorism to be emulated throughout the region.347  In addition to the education 
systems role as a bulwark against Islamic radicalization, the government’s successful 
counterterrorism measures include barring radical Saudi Imams from preaching within 
Kuwait, blocking Islamist websites promoting violence, and seizing radical books from 
mosques.348 
Conclusion 
 The Kuwaiti education system is a stark contrast to the education systems in 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen because it serves as a bulwark against religious terrorism, rather 
than a facilitator or contributor in the radicalization process.  The well-developed and 
highly-accessible Kuwaiti education system allows a large percentage of youth in Kuwait 
to receive a good education, relative to the rest of the region.  Additionally, Kuwaiti 
students face high employment opportunities upon graduation, which increase as their 
level of schooling rises.  Furthermore, the moderate nature of religious content in the 
Kuwaiti curriculum also prevents high levels of Islamic radicalization.  Only a small 
percentage of students who major in religious studies and lack the skills for secular jobs 
are left unemployed, and of these youth, a majority of them channel their dissatisfaction 
with their situation into support for Islamists who espouse socially conservative values, 
particularly in the area of gender segregation. 
Tellingly, Kuwait is only a small source of religious terrorism both domestically 
and abroad, unlike Saudi Arabia and Yemen.  Thousands of Yemenis and Saudis have 
traveled to Afghanistan for jihad and hundreds of them have gone to Iraq as foreign 
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fighters, but the number of Kuwaitis involved in either of these endeavors only amounts 
to the dozens.  Finally, only a small minority of Kuwaitis is interested in carrying out 
domestic terrorism, and what domestic terrorism has occurred has remained largely 
unorganized and unsuccessful. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Although appeals from the media and statements from Osama bin Laden have 
long underlined the need to examine the role that education plays in the radicalization 
process, this thesis is one of the first to study the relationship empirically.  This thesis 
argues that education plays an important role in the Islamic radicalization process by 
determining students’ levels of employability and indoctrination into radical religious 
ideologies.  Certain state education systems cause a particular group of students to 
receive high concentrations of radical religious education and deny them the opportunity 
to acquire job-relevant skills so that students have difficulty securing employment and are 
more likely to engage in religious terrorism.  The cases of Saudi Arabia, Yemen and 
Kuwait support this argument. 
 My research showed that the public education system in Saudi Arabia has been a 
major contributor to radical Islamic terrorism within and originating from the country.  
Public education in Saudi Arabia contains religious material that borders on being Salafi-
jihadi in nature, teaching its students hatred for Westerners and non-Muslims and calling 
upon them to defend their community from these corrupting influences through violent 
jihad.  The bifurcated structure of the education system channels poorly performing 
students into the literary religious track of schooling, where they receive higher 
concentrations of radical religious teachings.  This high concentration of radical religious 
instruction not only heightens students’ sensitivity to perceived foreign occupation, but 
also produces students lacking marketable skills.  Since the 1990s, when the Saudi 
government became increasingly unable to employ Saudi graduates, these students have 
faced growing unemployment.  Unemployed and having been taught that participation in 
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violent jihad against the apostate and infidel governments in the Middle East and the 
West is the most meaningful endeavor in life, these individuals are more likely to 
participate in radical Islamic terrorism.   
Profiles of domestic terrorists and Saudi foreign fighters provided evidence for 
the causal relationship between Saudi Arabia’s education system and participation in 
religious terrorism.  The domestic terror group, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), primarily consisted of young men in their late 20s and early 30s from the 
middle and lower-middle classes.  Many of these militants were students or unemployed 
individuals with degrees in religious studies.  There was a notable absence of AQAP 
members who had been trained or employed in the hard or natural sciences such as 
engineering, medicine, and economics.349  Recent data on Saudi foreign fighters in 
Afghanistan and Iraq also shows that a majority of militants are students and/or 
unemployed.350 
Yemen is also a case where the public education system, particularly its limited 
accessibility and poor quality, contributes to religious terrorism by leading students to 
receive their education at private religious institutions of a radical nature.  The public 
education system in Yemen is poorly developed and offers limited accessibility 
particularly in rural, geographically isolated locations where central government authority 
is weak or nonexistent.  Since the 1970s, when North Yemen encouraged the 
establishment of private Saudi-funded religious schools under the direction of a Salafi-
jihadi, ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, independent religious schools flourished in these areas, 
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and a number of these schools promote religious violence and terrorism.  Students at 
these schools are indoctrinated into an extremist ideology and are left unemployable 
because of their lack of vocational or technical skills.   
The thousands of Yemeni volunteers for the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s came 
overwhelmingly from North Yemen, where Saudi-backed Salafi-jihadi schools had been 
established in large numbers in the 1970s.  The Yemeni government’s success in 
temporarily halting radical Islamic terrorism in 2003 was partially dependent on its 
closure of these radical schools.  The Iman University, established by Salafi-jihadi ‘Abd 
al-Majid al-Zindani, and the Dar al-Hadith schools have been singled out as known 
sources of al-Qaeda militants, foreign fighters in Iraq and domestic terrorists responsible 
for attacks on Western targets.  Furthermore, the Yemeni government and other varied 
Yemeni sources have specifically noted the major contributing role of the continued 
existence of these radical religious institutions to the most recent wave of domestic 
terrorism. 
 Kuwait provides a stark contrast to the Yemen and Saudi Arabia cases: the 
country’s education system serves as a bulwark against religious terrorism.  Kuwait 
produces only a small number of foreign fighters and has experienced only sporadic, 
largely unsuccessful domestic terrorism, despite the heavy U.S. military presence in the 
country.  Unlike public education in Yemen, the schooling system in Kuwait is widely 
accessible and is ranked as one of the best in the Arab world.  Although there are required 
courses in Islamic studies at every level, only students majoring in religious studies 
receive higher concentrations of religious material.  More importantly, the religious 
teachings contained in school curricula are determined by mainstream Islamists who are 
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concerned with imparting conservative social values, and generally espouse a moderate 
and tolerant version of Islam, in direct contrast to the more radical content of Saudi 
curricula.   
The relatively high quality and accessibility of education in Kuwait ensures that 
students are prepared for the job market.  The moderate nature of Kuwaiti curricula’s 
religious content also ensures that the majority of those students who do receive higher 
concentrations of religious education, such as religious studies majors, are primarily 
concerned with instilling conservative social values in Kuwaiti society rather than waging 
violent jihad against non-Muslim influences.  Furthermore, educational figures that speak 
openly of the need for violent jihad against the West or espouse takfiri ideology are 
arrested and/or banned from teaching or preaching in Kuwaiti institutions.  As a result, 
Kuwaiti participation in domestic and foreign terrorism is limited to the dozens, in direct 
contrast to the hundreds and thousands of Saudis and Yemenis that have been involved in 
domestic and foreign terrorism respectively. 
Several policy implications flow from my theory and findings.  First, educational 
reform must be a key component of de-radicalizing Saudi Arabia and Yemen.  
Specifically, education systems’ content, structure, and accessibility need review and 
reform in countries producing high volumes of terrorists and foreign fighters.  Radical 
religious material needs to be revised, students need to study subjects that will prepare 
them for their domestic job markets, and in areas where public education is inaccessible, 
it either needs to be made available or an alternate form of non-radical education needs to 
be provided.  U.S. foreign policy should focus on encouraging these reforms by investing 
in education and human development, pressuring these governments as well as 
 116 
multinational organizations to bring about these reforms and then ensuring 
accountability.  The effectiveness of investing in educational development is supported 
by a study conducted in 2008.  The study found that foreign aid reduces terrorism 
produced by recipient countries and heavily emphasized the importance for Western 
democracies to invest in foreign aid, particularly to support education, in order to combat 
terrorism.351 
The religious content of education needs particular attention in reform efforts, as 
it is the primary radicalizing factor in education.  It is important to note that effective 
education reform may involve a return to orthodoxy rather than a move to secularism or 
liberalism.  A return to orthodox Islam, which teaches tolerance and moderation, coupled 
with the modernization of education systems to adjust to the technical needs of the job 
market is much more likely to be received with popular approval.  After touring 
madrassahs, or private Islamic schools, in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, British 
diplomat Alexander Evans warned Western politicians against demonizing madrassahs, 
saying instead, “They should encourage modernization but avoid insisting on 
secularization.”352  Hamid al-Majid, a professor of education at Imam Muhammad Ibn 
Saud University has even said, “'I believe the way to minimize extremism is to put 
greater emphasis on religious education, but in a good way.”353   
Furthermore, the United States, as well as any other non-Muslim actors and 
Western countries in particular, need to maintain a low profile in its involvement in 
                                                 
351
 Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen, “The Roles of Foreign Aid and Education in the War on 
Terror,” Public Choice 135, no. 3-4 (June 2008): 375-397. 
352
 Bernhard Zand, “Of Scholars and Zealots: Are Koran Schools Hotbeds of Terrorism?,” Spiegel Online, 
sec. 2007 March 20, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,472583,00.html.  
353
 Neil Macfarquhar, “A Nation Challenged: Education; Anti-Western and Extremist Views Pervade Saudi 
Schools,” New York Times, October 19, 2001, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9402E5DE133EF93AA25753C1A9679C8B63. 
 117 
education reform, restricting its interference to covert exchanges with government 
officials whenever possible.  The perception that the United States and the West are 
trying to pervert Islam to suit their own needs already exists in extremist rhetoric, and any 
public interference by Western forces in this matter would only validate these claims.  
Osama bin Laden has released numerous statements warning of this very attempt by the 
West to reform Islamic education in the Middle East.354 
The significance of education in the radicalization process can be seen in the 
successful militant rehabilitation programs in Saudi Arabia.  The Saudi program has 
processed hundreds of religious militants through reeducation classes with religious 
clerics to correct their “errant” ideologies and provide them with job training and 
financial assistance.  Although there have been recent reports of recidivism, the senior 
spokesman for the Saudi interior ministry claims that only one in ten terrorists that go 
through Saudi’s re-education program return to the al-Qaeda network.355  If Saudi 
Arabia’s public education system were to be reformed to reflect the principles of its 
militant reeducation program, extremism could be combated from the start instead of 
after the fact. 
Given the importance of education in the radicalization process in Saudi Arabia 
and Yemen, further work needs to be done to examine how education affects 
radicalization in other terror-producing countries.  In the 1990s, the Saudi government 
launched campaigns to establish religious schools in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, 
                                                 
354
 Shaun Watermann, “Bin Laden Tape Blasts Reform, Saudi Royals,” United Press International, 
December 18, 2004, http://archives.navyseals.com/community/articles/article.cfm?id=5368.  
355
 “Saudi Arabia: Education Deters Militants from More Violence, Says Official,” Adnkronos 
International, February 27, 2009, http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=3.0.3057977579.  
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Nigeria, Indonesia and the Philippines.356  These schools were likely to have incorporated 
the same radical ideology found in Saudi Arabia’s domestic school system and deserve 
further examination.  Additional case studies should include North African countries like 
Libya and Levantine countries such as Syria that are producing high levels of foreign 
fighters. 
Religious and public education in Pakistan has already been the subject of much 
terrorism research, particularly as private Islamic schools in Pakistan, especially the 
Saudi-funded institutes, have gained much attention over recent years for their role in 
militant recruitment.  A 2004 study has already emphasized the role of Pakistan’s state 
education system in Islamic radicalization, noting that Pakistan’s public schooling and 
higher education system have been known to provide up to 40% of extremist militants, 
while only 15 to 20% of madrassahs have been estimated to provide military training.357 
Further research should focus on a more detailed comparison of textbooks in 
Muslim countries producing relatively low amounts of terrorism with those producing 
high amounts.  This research would help determine what changes need to be made in 
religious educational content to promote moderation and tolerance without resorting to 
secularization.   
Additional research is also merited to further investigate Yemen’s current episode 
of domestic terrorism.  Very little research has focused on the al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) 
group that was founded in 2006 and is responsible for the current wave of terrorism.  
Extensive examination of AQY’s membership and their socioeconomic and educational 
backgrounds would provide further insight into the ongoing radicalization process. 
                                                 
356
 Zand, “Of Scholars and Zealots.” 
357
 C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for al-Qaeda and Other 
Organizations,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27 (2004): 489-504.  
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Further research should also be conducted on additional aspects of education and 
their relationship with religious radicalization.  One specific area of education meriting 
further examination is teachers’ attitudes towards educational material.  My thesis has 
primarily focused on educational material presented by textbooks, but a teacher’s attitude 
towards textbook material can significantly influence the way students view a subject.  
For example, if a teacher was to adopt a very moderate stance while the textbook were to 
present radical material, students would be getting a much different understanding of 
religious teachings than if a teacher were also to teach from a radical point of view. 
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APPENDIX A 
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